On the basis of existing capability initiatives, the planned development of EU crisis-management capabilities and an evolving EU-US strategic partnership, this chapter assesses what an autonomous EU will be able to do, in strategic and operational terms, in 2003 and at the end of the decade – and what it will not be able to do. It analyses the EU's dependence on NATO and the US, and looks at the question of EU intelligence capabilities.
Western Europe can cope with almost any crisis and war, including the situations envisaged in the three scenarios outlined in Chapter 2. But this is only possible if Europe is prepared to accept higher risks for engaged forces, if speed is not critical and if there are no competing military priorities. If Western European states can accept casualties and collateral damage, and if there is time to build political consensus and to deploy forces, then Europe can do a great deal on its own. However, if US high-intensity warfare is the only standard, if risks have to be kept to a minimum and a high operational tempo is needed to maintain public support and political alliances, then Europe faces major challenges in the next decade. On the other hand, Europeans and Americans have different global ambitions and priorities, and it is probable that the EU's standard of intervention will differ from the standards expected of NATO or a US-led coalition.
Although the development of the EU's capabilities since late 1999 has been vulnerable to criticism, not least because the political nature of the effort has been so dominant, the ESDP's structures and processes have taken huge strides forward, in a very short time, in terms of qualitative and quantitative output. The integrity, professionalism and initiative of the officers and civil servants involved, and the momentum of the ESDP process, should not be underestimated. Even a decrease in top-level political interest in the ESDP and the absence of spectacular new initiatives would therefore not mean that European integration and coordination in the security field had come to a halt. On the contrary, without a phase of consolidation after such an intense period of political initiatives, the whole ESDP enterprise would risk becoming a mere flow of announcements without much implementation and substance.
Half of European NATO members increased their defence spending in real terms, albeit marginally, in 2000. Elements such as intelligence received a boost due to the war on terrorism. Nevertheless, European defence budgets are unlikely to increase significantly in the medium term. On the contrary, the overall trend in total European defence spending remains downward in real terms. In addition, the challenges of multinational coordination and procurement will not disappear, and the restructuring needed for substantial savings and for the reorientation of many European armed forces will remain difficult. Conversely, the cuts in European defence expenditure throughout much of the 1990s have obviously not been severe enough to force governments into far-reaching multinational cooperation, the pooling of assets and capabilities, role specialisation or the fundamental rationalisation of defence industries.1
Relatively little money is spent on force transformation, procurement and research and development. While the UK and Sweden spend more than a third of their defence budgets in these areas, and France more than a quarter, the majority of Western European countries spend less than 20%.2 Nonetheless, a number of large procurement projects with considerable defence-industrial potential are in the pipeline. Europeans have committed themselves to producing and procuring approximately 180 Airbus A400M strategic-lift aircraft. Even if this figure is not fully attained, there will probably be a significant and specific capability increase (though it will not give the Europeans a truly heavy-load, long-distance airlift capability because the A400M carries only 50% more than the common C-130 and a fraction of the C-17 or C-5).3 The increased coordination and pooling of existing sea and airlift, fighters and aircraft logistics could enhance overall European lift capability. However, a German proposal for a joint European air-transport command, launched in the wake of the Kosovo campaign and included as a goal in the DCI, has not made progress.4 The idea is rational, cost-effective and technically simple, but obviously unpopular in European capitals. Perhaps the Prague Capabilities Commitment will help European governments change their minds. France and the UK are acquiring several types of cruise missile, and the French and Germans are developing reconnaissance satellites (Helios II and SARLupe). Several states are acquiring UAVs and advanced fighters (Rafale, Eurofighter and Gripen), enhancing their precision-strike capability and acquiring new tactical communications systems, the Meteor air-to-air missile, Patriot PAC-3 extended-air-defence systems, main battle tanks, tactical airlift (C-130JS, C-295S), theatre transport such as the NH-90 helicopter, amphibious-warfare ships (LPD and ALSL) and roll-on/roll-off sealift.
Many of the DCI ‘wish-list’ items are not given the same priority as these projects. In fact, some take up such a large portion of procurement budgets in certain countries that new programmes more in tune with the network-centric philosophy of the DCI cannot gain ground. It remains unlikely that NATO members will jointly acquire airborne ground-surveillance systems (Joint-STARS-type assets) or new early-warning systems such as AW ACS in the medium term. Other challenges or capability gaps identified in the DCI include plans for an integrated interoperable logistics information architecture, multinational exercise programmes, operational simulation devices, full interoperability between tactical communications systems, airfield-management systems, advanced air defence, combat search-and-rescue, air-to-air refuelling, electronic counter-measures/jamming aircraft, defences against weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and protection against modern sea mines and torpedoes. Europe is still a long way from even contemplating moving communications, including satellite communication, to broadband capabilities, an element given high priority by the US DoD and the very essence of US military transformation. For both the US and Europe, it is not a question of physics and know-how but of investment priorities and vision. As of 2002, it looked unlikely that any European government would be prepared to scrap a major equipment project such as a new line of fighters, battle tanks or helicopters in favour of something as low profile as communications, regardless of the revolutionary potential.
In the area of NBC protection, not least in the light of terrorist threats, there are acute needs in personal equipment and in safeguarding both military and non-military infrastructure within the area of operations and at home. Further capability gaps identified in the HPC – particularly in support, logistics, engineering and medical capabilities – are equally vital in crisis-management operations. Advanced fighter aircraft, precision-guided munitions, non-lethal weapons, SEAD and day/night and all-weather air-weapon systems are all being developed, but not in sufficient numbers to significantly enhance Europe's autonomous military capabilities.5 Moreover, the proportion of logistics and support units made available to the full range of NATO missions has not, and probably will not, increase significantly.
Many current European procurement projects constitute massive duplication on a European scale. Is it wise of Europe to develop so many different types of traditional capabilities, such as main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, fighters, submarines and surface combatants? For tomorrow's challenges, does Europe really need these platforms, none of which are categorised by any of the WEU, NATO or the EU capability inventories as shortfalls?
Even if projects on the drawing board are funded (which is far from certain), it will take time for new assets to become operational capabilities. In the case of the A400M, the first aircraft will fly in 2008 at the earliest, but realistically probably later. It will be several more years before units are fully operational, and a sufficient number of aircraft exists to make a significant contribution to Europe's overall airlift capability. In the meantime, leasing US C-17S like the UK has done may be an option, if strategic airlift is being acquired for operational, rather than mainly defence-industrial, reasons. For other major procurement programmes, such as reconnaissance satellites, cruise missiles, tactical airlift and advanced fighters, quantities are relatively small, and there will be little operational impact until 2005–2010.6 It is also questionable whether sufficient money will be spent on the less spectacular capability gaps identified by the DCI and in the HPC. High-profile pet projects with greater defence-industrial links or clear application to defending against terrorism (of which there are few in the area of conventional military procurement) may attract the lion's share of political attention in European capitals whether they are needed (from a European perspective) or not. Realistically, based on what is in the pipeline and even taking the Prague Capabilities Commitment into account, a substantial increase in Europe's overall capability to successfully engage in high-end crisis management should not be expected in the medium term.
Many allies have indicated through their commitments to DCI-related Force Goals that they are not taking DCI implementation seriously.7 As the US DoD noted in a report to Congress in March 2001, in many respects progress towards DCI objectives has been disappointingly slow.8 The fact that the US had to relaunch a slimmed-down capability initiative in preparation for NATO's 2002 Prague Summit is further proof of the lack of progress – at least from the US perspective and by the standards of US military transformation. The DCI capability gaps will limit the EU's capacity to engage in the most demanding Petersberg tasks, not to mention US-led coalitions. These gaps will be particularly evident should the EU choose to engage autonomously.
Equally, it is questionable whether the HPC and ECAP will make much difference. It could be argued that a considerable portion of European force modernisation would probably have happened anyway – even without the DCI and the Headline Goal. The continued investment by European governments in traditional capabilities indicates that the capability initiatives have either not been understood, or have had little or no impact on procurement priorities. Perhaps the greatest benefits of these capability initiatives are political; their ‘added value’ may only develop in the longer term through increasingly coordinated defence planning and the development of new capabilities for a wider spectrum of engagement.
It is also questionable whether the projects planned by Europe's defence industry are on the same technological and interoperability level as the US. US capabilities are often a generation ahead of the Europeans doctrinally and technically, which means that interoperability is likely to remain a problem.9 The speed of the US military transformation process paves the way for even greater capability gaps. However, just as it is important for the Europeans to be interoperable with the US, so too the US must secure interoperability with the Europeans, if it wants to work in coalitions and cooperate within the NATO framework.10 Joint and combined US and European rapid reaction forces such as the NRF could be a step in the right direction.
In military terms, what is Europe able to manage on its own in 2003? For corps-sized operations, the European Military Staff as currently envisaged will probably be too small for effective operational planning (although this is a view not shared by all in the EU Military Staff as it grows larger and more confident – even in the planning sphere). In times of crisis, it is likely that planning will be supported (or essentially executed) by a lead nation or lead planning headquarters, identified early on. There is no reason to doubt that the British, French and German joint operational staff could produce credible plans, ideally (but not necessarily) in coordination with, and/or with the support of, NATO operational planning staff.
The primary constraint would be the time allotted to producing the palette required, from pre-crisis contingency plans to concepts of operation and operational plans, plus the time needed for them to be cleared by all the involved structures and member states. There is a risk that the lack of linkage between member states, the ESDP structures and operational staff (and back up the chain of command) will prove a bottleneck in a crisis. There is significant political sensitivity around establishing ‘EU-only’ structures and processes, and creating multinational staff out of national operational staff, along with secure command, control, communications, computer and intelligence links between all the levels and parties involved, is a costly and complex process. In the meantime, either multinationality and/or effective and secure links will probably have to be sacrificed. Transmitting secure broadband data from surveillance and reconnaissance assets across national contingents is an even more distant possibility.
In terms of actual operational capability, the forces committed to the Headline Goal do not constitute a fighting force, but rather are a mere catalogue of capabilities committed on a case-by-case basis by individual states. Nevertheless, the sum of just the German, British, French, Italian and Spanish contributions represents a sizeable capability of over 60,000 soldiers and almost 300 combat aircraft for a continuous one-year operation. Europe can handle a situation like Operation Alba: a brigade-sized multinational operation, where combat intensity is relatively low and there is no organised resistance and therefore little need for advanced air and naval support. Logistical trails are short, and the small force can be managed even without a large logistics base or host-nation support and infrastructure. However, even in Operation Alba Europe had no capacity to escalate. In fact, the Combined Joint Planning Staff in NATO had prepared a contingency plan for a US-led evacuation should the need arise.11 In 2002, while the EU was politically prepared to take over from NATO's European-led operation Amber Fox in Macedonia, some member states were reluctant to do so for fear of over-stretching their forces because of other peace-support commitments.
Even without external help, the ‘Assistance to Civilians’ scenario, including smaller evacuation operations, should not pose a major challenge for the EU. The UK, France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands have long had such a capability and EU coordination should be manageable – particularly if there are one or two lead nations. In an acute evacuation scenario, it is also probable that the luxury of EU multinationality can be sacrificed. The ‘Conflict Prevention/Preventive Deployment’ scenario is also within current European capacities, though there would be some flaws in the high-end spectrum. These could perhaps be managed on a bilateral basis, or with a marginally higher tolerance for collateral damage and risk. Gradual improvements in sustain-ability mean that a one-year operation of up to 60,000 troops for the Conflict Prevention/Preventive Deployment scenario is not a major issue. Unless the EU merely takes over an already-established mission, the main challenges will lie in drawing down existing deployments and reducing redeployment time. Should forces need new training and equipment, or if the deployment takes place in difficult climates, sustainability could become a problem, even for the Conflict Prevention/Preventive Deployment scenario. Concurrent operations would also present problems. Certain combinations of operations, particularly taking place a good distance apart, would put greater strains on some capabilities than would be the case were the most demanding scenario occurring alone.
Strategic decision-making, operational command and control and intelligence will remain bottlenecks. Indeed, the whole process of EU decision-making and unity of command will remain underdeveloped. In intelligence, even with rapid development, French and German reconnaissance satellites will be operational at the earliest in 2004, and European sensors will remain few in number and, in most cases, at least a generation behind American assets. Intelligence cooperation among EU members and the EU's central assessment capability will remain poor. On the hardware side, Europe's ability to act autonomously in high-tempo peace-enforcement operations and its high-end projection capabilities will remain limited. Perhaps the most dangerous limitation will be Europe's poor capacity to escalate. Europe will not have additional combat-ready divisions, carrier battle groups and marine and air expeditionary forces deployable at short notice, either for escalation or for large-scale evacuations; nor will it have the means to deploy and support them.
EU members will be able to do much in military crisis management by 2003. But autonomous, high-tempo peace enforcement in a non-permissive environment will not be possible – particularly if the operation is larger than divisional, risks have to be kept low and deployment times within the Headline Goal criteria. At the high end of the spectrum, EU states will remain dependent on the US for operational, and perhaps also for political, support.
On the basis of what has been decided as of late 2002, significant increases in European military crisis-management capabilities are likely by 2010 – at least by European standards, as defined in 1999–2002 – even if the ESDP process slows down. It is probable that both sea and airlift will increase, although whether they do so on the scale envisaged at the beginning of the decade is less clear. Nevertheless, mobility and readiness will improve. Precision-guided munitions and cruise missiles will be more readily available, and electronic-warfare and SEAD capabilities will probably also have increased. It is, however, difficult to see significant improvements in operational command-and-control networks and support elements, including logistics, engineering and medical support.
By 2010, military reform will have been completed in France, and probably also in Germany. Most European armed forces will be geared towards military crisis management, and expeditionary capabilities will play a central role. Multinationality and interoperability will probably have further evolved. Sustainability, deploy-ability and effective engagement will have moved forward. The EU structures, and probably also individual member states, will probably be better at strategic decision-making, intelligence-gathering and strategic (and perhaps operational) planning than they were at the beginning of the decade. By 2010, it is likely that EU states will be able to meet the 2003 Headline Goal in full. This does not, however, mean that Europe will have fulfilled every DCI objective or that the capability gap across the Atlantic will have decreased. On the contrary; the US will have made its own capability increases, particularly in high-technology areas such as command, control and communications and in the whole sphere of sensors and intelligence gathering and dissemination. Judging by the much larger investment being made in the US on network-centric warfare elements, the technical gap is bound to increase. The question is whether the doctrinal and operational gap will be even greater. Much will depend on the level of US-European cooperation in combined experimentation and force development.
EU defence planning, particularly if non-military and military capabilities are linked, can play an important role in increasing European capabilities. The EU Capabilities Development Mechanism will probably be geared not only to updating commitments and filling gaps, but also to formulating political goals, setting operational targets, managing national commitments and future capabilities enhancements, linking lessons learnt to planned needs and introducing peer pressure to the review phase. Key aspects are the implementation of crisis-management mechanisms and capabilities, the quality validation of those mechanisms and capabilities, and the establishment of truly operational capabilities for joint and multinational war-fighting.
However, by 2010 the Headline Goal is bound to have changed in line with changes in EU cohesion, integration and perceived threats. Where yesterday's goals are directed towards conventional military crisis management, tomorrow's may focus on other challenges, ranging from territorial defence and counter-terrorism to cyber-attacks and CBRNE weapons. The EU's goals may develop along the lines of its comparative advantages, and non-military crisis management and conflict prevention may be seen as more important than the military components.
Beyond 2010, European processes, procedures, doctrines and modes of operation may have developed in such a way that they do not fully correlate to US and NATO standards, although a certain level of interoperability would most likely be maintained. In the longer term, depending on the involvement of the UK in the development of the EU's operational capability and cooperation between Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries, it should not be taken for granted that Anglo-Saxon methods and procedures will remain the natural choice in all areas of European cooperation. There is thus a risk that this may add to further interoperability challenges with the US.
The EU sees itself as a sophisticated international player with high moral standards and values. As a result, a number of factors could limit its operational capability. Although the Headline Goal is not bound by a formal UN mandate, high standards will be set for EU intervention.12 The intervention must be ‘just’, a concept which, aside from self-defence, has historically included punishing an aggressor or intervening on behalf of victims of aggression.13 The intervention must be morally justified and must be a last resort, to be used only when diplomatic and non-violent means have failed. Thus, few EU military crisis-management engagements will be initiated without considerable international debate and the lengthy exploration of non-violent alternatives. Surprise and pre-emptive force are unlikely.
Given the heterogeneous nature of the EU's composition, the fact that many member states would want a UN mandate before any military intervention and the need for close consultation with NATO, there is little reason to believe that securing legal justification for action will be any quicker in the EU than it is in UN peace-support operations – unless clear interests are threatened, as was the case with Operation Alba in 1997 or after the terrorist strikes in the US in 2001. (Less adversarial forms of military crisis management, such as naval patrols, as well as operations in response to acute situations, such as evacuations, can of course be performed nationally, or collectively under the EU, without any formal mandate or lengthy debate.) There may also be competition between the EU and NATO. EU bilateral dialogue with all NATO member states and Russia, and perhaps coordination and cooperation, is another potentially complicating factor – particularly if key players want to delay an operation, or prefer a different institutional slant.
Two further factors may also be important. The first is proportionality, which demands certain capabilities, like detailed intelligence and precision-guided munitions. ‘Dumb bombs’ are not politically acceptable unless vital or existential interests are at stake.14 Second, there must be a reasonable chance of success (and again raises the issue of escalation). The need to define proportionality throughout a crisis, and with it to set targeting criteria and operational tempos, together with continuous assessment of the likelihood of success, could lead to debate among EU members. Target selection by consensus does not sound easy, or militarily decisive. As long as all EU states must give their consent to military action under an EU flag, decision-making is likely to be complicated.
Before leaving his post in mid-2000, SACEUR Wesley Clark suggested that the gradualist approach to combat that NATO had demonstrated over Kosovo might not succeed the next time the alliance used force.15 If NATO (with the full support and dominance of the US) tends to behave this way, how cohesive and decisive can the EU hope to be in crisis management? For operations or threats that demand a more proactive or pre-emptive approach, or where speed is important, national intervention by one or more allies or other ad hoc arrangements under a lead nation might be more appropriate, with or without a symbolic blessing from the EU and/or NATO member states. If vital interests are at stake or if a broadly-recognised case could be made for self-defence, NATO or a coalition of the willing with NATO's political support will for the foreseeable future remain the natural choice.
Whatever CFSP or ESDP activity takes place, be it in the pre-crisis or the crisis phase, intelligence for strategic decision-making is paramount. Along with operational self-sustainability, autonomous decision-making is a formal EU goal. Whether an engagement demands EU-NATO and EU-US coordination, or if it is an autonomous EU operation, EU bodies and member states must be capable of taking decisions based on their own assessments. Given that intelligence cooperation in NATO has been non-existent, why should cooperation be any more effective within the EU? The difference is that the autonomous strategic decision-making capability is already a political goal; in the near future, there will be a political and operational demand for EU intelligence.
There are two purposes for EU intelligence. The first relates to long-term conflict prevention and the EU's position as an international actor. Pre-crisis intelligence can help the EU to use its economic, diplomatic and military conflict-prevention means more effectively. The second intelligence element is related to operational engagement in times of crisis. Although each demands very different kinds of analysis and capabilities, both are essential for strategic decision-making.
Current processes are not satisfactory because they are based on the principle that all intelligence, with the exception of the EU's Satellite Centre, is channelled from member states; the ESDP structures, including the Joint Situation Centre, should be happy with whatever they get. As a consequence, the EU's assessment capability is confined to a tiny Joint Situation Centre in Brussels, and there is little capacity either to check the validity of national intelligence or to compile broader intelligence assessments where national military intelligence is only one part of the equation. Little national intelligence is tailored to the needs of the ESDP structures, or put in the CFSP and ESDP context. For quick and effective strategic decision-making, current processes are not good enough.
A comprehensive joint European intelligence-assessment capability could prove an invaluable step towards more effective EU strategic decision-making for both conflict prevention and crisis management. Such an intelligence capability, within the intergovernmental Second Pillar of the EU, could also function as an intelligence coordinator in fields such as terrorism and unconventional threats. In the HHC of 2000, EU states identified the need for a facility for intelligence fusion, analysis, storage and dissemination, and for an EU Military Staff Intelligence Division.16 Although the latter already exists, it falls short of the comprehensive intelligence function required by the EU.17 Equally, the SG/HR Policy Unit, albeit highly capable, is too small and not geared towards intelligence analysis or coordination. The Policy Unit would be better able to serve the SG/HR and the Political and Security Committee with assessments and option proposals if it were supported by an intelligence-analysis capability. Other functions, such as the Director-General for External Affairs (primarily DGE VIII), would also benefit.
The EU's envisaged intelligence function would provide common assessments of political and operational relevance. Although any structure would spend much time comparing and compiling national assessments, the function would have to be able to produce its own analyses and assessments, both short- and long-term. This would demand a sizeable capability. EU member states would not only have full access to EU assessments, but would also be obliged to contribute raw and processed data. The intelligence function would be one element in an over-arching European network of bilateral and multilateral intelligence cooperation.
Using capabilities that already exist, the Satellite Centre could become the hub for the interpretation of satellite intelligence and imagery from European commercial and military assets. The key for the EU, via the centre, is to have increased access to French and German military satellites, including in some cases resolution codes and algorithms. For this to be a European project, full access should be provided to all EU member states, unless they choose to opt out. Sharing operating costs, and perhaps research and development costs, would have to be agreed between all the states that would benefit from the imagery, or that are involved in the EU intelligence function.
EU intelligence cooperation should also be developed at the tactical level. Experience from peace-support operations in the Balkans shows that, although intelligence remains a jealously-guarded national commodity, tactical-level cooperation is possible. The National Intelligence Cell network in SFOR and KFOR headquarters is a useful and proven model for EU-led peace-support operations.
In terms of data input, most capability assessments stress the need for high-end technical platforms such as satellites. Although defence-industrial interests, technology transfer and national prestige are significant issues, it is important to recognise that expensive platforms are no panacea.18 High-tech assets might be spectacular and costly, but they are relatively useless unless the data they produce are properly received, assessed, contextualised and disseminated to the relevant bodies or individuals – and all in time to be useful. Real-time intelligence calls for huge resources in order to direct the satellites, receive the data, interpret them and forward them to the relevant platform or decision-maker. The ESDP structures will not have the capacity for quick interpretation, dissemination and input to policy channels in the short to medium term, let alone a real-time capability. Furthermore, for decent coverage, several different types and more than a handful of satellites are needed; however, their provision is unlikely within the next decade. Besides, almost all threat/intelligence assessments need to be based on multiple sources – not just technical data.
On the other hand, if the main function of the satellites is to give sporadic input on global flashpoints, or to provide Europe with collateral information against which to verify US intelligence, Europe could probably manage with a handful of French and German military satellites. With clear commitment and financing, such a capability could be realised in the medium term, perhaps by 2005. This would still be a clear case of duplication, just as for most military assets that exist on both sides of the Atlantic. Such a limited European capability would not make the EU self-sufficient in intelligence (as called for in the Headline Goal), and the EU and its members would still remain largely dependent on US intelligence capabilities.19
As well as developing satellites for a limited autonomous capability, there must also be operational alternatives. Much can be done through modifying existing platforms, using the whole palette of intelligence sources and through international coordination and cooperation. Europe's wide array of signals and human intelligence, coupled with existing satellite and air assets, could provide much strategic and operational intelligence for conflict prevention and crisis management if cooperation increased. For these combined assets to be effective, they must be coordinated at the strategic EU level, and fully integrated at the operational level.
Operationally, a combination of top-end special forces (such as the UK's Special Air Service (SAS) or France's Commando Parachute Group), advanced signals-intelligence capabilities (such as those provided by Sweden in Bosnia and Kosovo), UAVs and aerial photo and radar reconnaissance can, in most operational situations, provide more relevant intelligence at a fraction of the investment and operating cost than satellite imagery and US Joint-STAR input.
The two greatest threats facing the ESDP are failure to act successfully and disengagement by a key European player. In the pre-cri-sis phase, Europeans are likely to have trouble deciding if a crisis is developing, what sort of crisis it is and how best to deal with it. National policies, prestige and ambition may collide, and nationally-slanted intelligence may further diminish the chances of achieving a common view. Atlanticists would probably disagree with advocates of a European approach, while others would perhaps opt out altogether. As long as vital interests are not at stake, issues of internal EU and US-EU coordination and links to multilateral bodies like the UN and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would probably further complicate decision-making. Economic, diplomatic and military instruments may not be properly coordinated or used to their full potential.
Should the EU decide to mount a military operation, this would obviously mean that conflict prevention had failed. Even with a military operation under way (with at least the political support of all member states), any perceived shortcomings would damage the credibility of the EU and the ESDP. Challenges would include ensuring political cohesion among the members and other contributors, making sure that strategic decision-making did not falter and coping with military capability flaws and poor means of military escalation. The US could also choose not to support the operation – even if asked to do so; however, any perceived lack of support would affect NATO solidarity. A divided and frustrated Europe will not produce a stronger alliance or a credible strategic partner for the US.
On the other hand, even a perceived operational failure, or an embarrassing bail-out by the US or NATO, would probably not halt the CFSP or ESDP. Finger-pointing would temporarily damage European cohesion and leave a bitter after-taste, but the CFSP and ESDP are much larger phenomena than a one-off military operation. As Alyson Bailes argues, greater operational experience will make the CFSP more ‘street-wise’ and effective. Engagement will gradually increase the level of non-military and military coordination, and will enhance EU effectiveness. It is probable that the EU will also learn lessons from, and be influenced by, non-EU engagements.
Should decision-making at the EU level prove impossible for a prolonged period, perhaps several years, or if a series of crisis-management efforts are seen as failures, alternatives to the CFSP and ESDP may well develop. There will always be European states willing to cooperate outside international organisations, if these bodies are not functioning adequately. On the other hand, even if institutional cooperation succeeds but the mission fails – based on the experience of UN and NATO operations – the EU as an institution will probably be a useful scapegoat.
The second threat – disengagement by one of the key European players – would potentially have more serious and longer-term consequences than failure. Should the UK, France or Germany turn their back on the common EU foreign and defence policy or actively obstruct the EU, the ESDP project would swiftly stall.20 Any long-term stagnation would be damaging for European integration as a whole and for relations among European states, particularly if the US at the same time gave priority to homeland defence, leaving Europe fragmented and lonely, and without the ability to act as a strategic partner with Washington. Large-scale recession, a collapse in the value of the euro or mass unemployment could quickly shift political attention away from secondary issues like the ESDP. Such serious developments could affect defence budgets, capability-building and most aspects of crisis management. Policies may turn inwards, towards protectionism and re-nationalisation. In the words of Helmut Schmidt, the EU is still a very young and fragile creature, and can be destroyed by national egotism as well as by international upheavals.21
Until effective European strategic decision-making structures are in place, and until the EU can effectively coordinate economic, diplomatic and military elements, Europe as a coherent defence entity will carry little weight or credibility, its operational limitations evident for all to see. As of late 2003, and with the Headline Goal deadline, the ESDP will be fair game for international criticism. The EU will have functioning structures at the higher level and a considerable number of capabilities in place, but they will not be fully efficient, effective or potent in conflict prevention and crisis management.
This vulnerability cannot be blamed on NATO, on the US or on new threats. The US and NATO have offered their support and cooperation. Although close cooperation is rational and logical, the US or NATO as an institution cannot enhance the EU's crisis-management capabilities, military, non-military or bureaucratic. It is up to the Europeans, and above all the UK, France and Germany, to rationalise, coordinate, cooperate and produce better capabilities. Only by increasing its capabilities by innovative and proactive measures can Europe reduce its vulnerability and lay the foundations for credible crisis management.