This chapter analyses the Headline Goal and the EU's development of scenarios for the forces committed to it, as well as other elements of crisis management such as decision-making, planning and intelligence capabilities, and civilian capabilities. Together, these com-ponents constitute the current palette of EU assets and capabilities for conflict prevention and crisis management; in essence, this is the EU's contribution to the security dimension of Europe's strategic partnership with the US.
Like many ESDP initiatives, the Headline Goal is essentially a compromise between the UK and France. This does not make it less important, although it does help to explain the sometimes ambiguous and challenging formulations it uses. Although the Goal is set for the end of 2003, it reflects the priorities of 1999, the lessons and frustrations that followed the Kosovo crisis and the challenges Europe faced in deploying yet another large formation to the Balkans. The quantitative goal also reflects the Balkans experience. It is set at corps level (60,000 troops or up to 15 brigades), plus air and naval elements.
Size is not the major problem. The challenges relating to the Headline Goal concern sustainability (specified at one year), readiness (set at 60 days), combat intensity and complexity and self-sus-tainability. The Headline Goal was not formulated for major high-intensity warfare with a whole corps plus naval and air capabilities on the other side of the globe. The level of ambition is much more modest and, given existing capabilities, more realistic.
Depending on the other commitments of nations contributing to the European military operation, the availability and rotation of troops will be challenging. Sustaining 60,000 soldiers for one year engages at least 120,000 troops on the ground plus air and naval elements.1 Depending on the specific mission and the amount of air and naval assets required, the total EU commitment for a one-year operation could engage perhaps 180,000–240,000 men and women in uniform. Moreover, for each half-year rotation, units are ‘booked’ for 18 months, and cannot be used for other operations.2
For an operation longer than one year, the total number of ground forces required for sustaining a corps-size operation would probably be at least 240,000. This is a four-to-one ratio for ground forces, but recent UN and NATO operations, and more than ten years of Balkan peace-support operations for most European armed forces, suggest that even this is insufficient for longer-term sustainment. Again, significant air and naval elements must be added, giving a total sum of perhaps around 350,000 European soldiers, airmen and sailors needed to sustain a joint operation more than one year. It is easy to forget that deployed soldiers are not mere statistics, but individuals with families, military careers and opportunities outside the military. Most units also have duties at home and training requirements for operations other than EU crisis management. In short, the Headline Goal is no small commitment, and will involve a substantial portion of Europe's assets and military capabilities.
As in most cases of crisis management, sustainability is more or less a question of national priorities. Without drawing down existing military crisis-management commitments, and based on the availability of non-engaged rapid-reaction forces in Europe throughout the 1990s, few EU members apart from the UK and France will be able to produce more than a minor, perhaps even a symbolic, additional mid to long term commitment in the next five years or so. Particularly challenging will be the sustainability of forces that are already in short supply, such as logistics, engineers, medical services, helicopter crews and other specialists. Should the operation take place in a climate zone such as a desert or tropical environment, availability would be even more constricted, whatever the formal Headline Goal commitment. Finnish, Danish, Dutch or Hungarian taxpayers would hardly accept keeping a significant portion of their armed forces trained and equipped for desert or jungle warfare.
The stated high-end commitment is that the EU will be able to deploy up to 60,000 troops in theatre, beyond Europe, within 60 days from an EU Council order to deploy. It took longer than 60 days for NATO, with the full support of US strategic lift, to deploy a corps-sized formation to Albania and Macedonia in 1999; 1,751 airlift missions were involved, together with the movement of 78,000 tonnes of supplies and 42,380 passengers by air and sea.4
If there is little warning and the bulk of European forces are engaged in major international operations or have important duties at home, EU member states will most likely not be able to field a large contingent at such short notice, unless it is merely a question of relabelling an already-established force. Should commercial air-and sealift be inappropriate or unavailable, and US airlift not wanted or not available, EU member states will have difficulty quickly deploying forces several thousand kilometres away. Although with a couple of months' warning many of these deployment challenges can be managed. Besides, not all crises will be conveniently located near main airports or harbours.
The mechanisms and arrangements for deploying a major force, and transforming individual national contributions into a combined and joint fighting force, do not yet exist, nor will they be developed overnight. In other words, getting forces from A to B in time is one thing; achieving an effective and coordinated multinational fighting force in such a short time is another.
The Headline Goal states that forces will be capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks. Although the scope of these tasks is open to debate, as of 2002 the most demanding is peace enforcement in a non-permissive environment. This means that Europe should be capable of using force on a par with the Anglo-French Rapid Reaction Force in August-September 1995 in central Bosnia during Operation Deliberate Force, but on a larger scale and against two parties at the same time. On the other hand, it does not mean that a European operation would necessarily adopt a similar operational tempo, targeting policy or risk level as NATO's Operation Allied Force or other US-led military operations.5 For European forces, combat intensity up to and including peace-enforcement scenarios is not a problem. Most European forces, mainly thanks to a decade of crisis management in the Balkans, are also well prepared for complex situations, ranging from shifting tension levels, civil-military interaction and multinationality down to the lower tactical level.
The Headline Goal force should be ‘militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logis-tics [and] other combat support services’.6 In other words, it must be self-sufficient and have all the intelligence, transport and com-mand-and-control capabilities it needs for peace-enforcement oper-ations. Today there are serious flaws in these areas. Questions arise over what individual European governments and their armed forces will demand as the minimum level of these capabilities for a high-end, high-risk operation.
The Headline Goal is primarily a political project; at least at this early stage in the ESDP, it is as much the result of political frustration, the dynamics of integration and national defence-industrial interests as it is an expression of the wish to enhance member states' crisis-management capability per se. There is an understanding within the EU and in individual member states that the Headline Goal will be realised, whatever assets and capabilities Europeans possess when they are faced with a crisis. The decision to focus on the Petersberg tasks reflects the lowest common denominator among the EU member states, and most European governments have their own domestic interpretation of what the Headline Goal is, how it should be developed and towards what long-term political goal. On the other hand, setting a target and then moving towards it, not an uncommon method in the EU, has proved a successful way of developing the Union. The Headline Goal will probably be updated as the ESDP and European requirements evolve.
There is an assumption that, in the event of a crisis that demands European action, the US or others may support some European states bilaterally. Faced with a crisis that Europe cannot effectively manage, the European states would then either accept US support bilaterally or through arrangements in NATO, or would redefine ‘European’ interests, policies and operational ambitions downwards. The Europeans have little choice but to be pragmatic and realistic when it comes to an actual military engagement. However, for all high-end and militarily difficult tasks, or for tasks that clearly lie beyond the Petersberg spectrum, there is a general assumption in European capitals that NATO or a US-led coalition will be the natural choice.
Counting on US engagement, or EU-US cooperation, would save the EU from exposing its immediate capability flaws, and allow the Europeans more time to enhance their capabilities. The basic argument is that the general imperatives of US influence and NATO's raison d'être will ensure US engagement in any major crisis in the European area. In most global crisis management, and particularly in crises where even the Europeans are prepared to go to war, it is assumed that both Europe (or at least a selection of Europeans) and the US share common interests. The problem with this assumption is that a strong-minded European NATO member, for reasons relating to the EU or for the sake of national prestige, could block NATO from taking the lead, or lending collective assets. Alternatively, the US might choose not to be involved in European crisis management because of other geographical or political priorities, including homeland defence. Another possibility is that EU states may simply choose not to engage under the EU banner, after rephrasing their collective interests in the given case, as happened in the African Great Lakes contingency in 1996 and 1997. Besides, coalitions-of-the-willing will always remain an option.
In 1996, the NAC agreed to what came to be known as the ‘Berlin package’. To develop the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO, using the formula ‘separable but not separate capabilities’, NATO would support the WEU with planning and command arrangements and other assets and capabilities.7 The 1999 NATO summit expanded the Berlin package into ‘Berlin plus’, which gave ‘assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities’ and ensured the ‘presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets’. It also developed the role of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) in order to support European command options.8
There were four main motives behind Berlin plus. First, the Europeans asked for access. This reflected their acceptance that their operational capabilities were insufficient, and that they therefore had to borrow from the alliance. At the EU summit in Nice in 2000, the EU requested access only to ‘collective’ NATO assets and capabilities. Second, it was an effort to enhance direct EU-NATO cooperation. For the US, this would prevent the creation of a separate European SHAPE, and ensured that EU operations were conducted in accordance with NATO doctrine.9 Third, there was recognition in Europe of the US argument that establishing separate EU planning assets would damage NATO. Fourth, it was a way for the US, Turkey and other non-EU NATO members to ensure that they were not sidelined in any EU operation – not least in the political deliberations ahead of and during an operation. By maintaining control over NATO assets and capabilities, non-EU states could still have influence and a role. Such EU-NATO arrangements are, however, controversial, and highly politicised.
In the ‘Berlin-plus’ arrangement, where the EU would be assured of access to NATO assets and capabilities, access was highly probable, but not guaranteed. This issue was widely debated within NATO. France, for reasons of EU autonomy and for fear of institutionalising what is seen as the EU's dependence on NATO and the US, raised objections to giving the EU guaranteed access to NATO planning capabilities. NATO's International Staff argued that the alliance could only promise ‘assured access’ because planning staff might become overloaded with requests from the EU, as well as from NATO. Turkey, as a non-EU European member of NATO, has been trying to translate ‘assured access’ into a guarantee of Turkish involvement in ESDP operations. Despite a diplomatic formula brokered by the US and UK in late 2001, this issue continued to block full implementation of the assured-access approach because Greece, which is in both the EU and NATO, made its agreement conditional on Turkish concessions regarding Cyprus, and is adamantly against increased Turkish influence in the EU. From the viewpoint of the US and most European governments, NATO's guarantee of operational-planning support to the EU is essential for preventing an EU attempt to create its own capabilities outside the NATO framework.
NATO defence planning coordinates national forces and capabilities to attain common goals. The planning cycle includes Ministerial Guidance (strategic goals), Force Proposals (force targets, essentially formulated by NATO military staff in consultation with individual member states), Force Goals (proposals adopted by individual members) and a mechanism for peer review and progress assessment of the national goals.10 Although this process has been important in setting common goals and in building confidence among NATO members, it is slow and cumbersome. There is poor coordination between the various functions and capabilities, no guarantee that nations will fulfil their commitments and there is room for reform. In reality, few states are prepared to have their priorities dictated externally, and national defence ministries are keen to ensure that force goals match what they planned to do anyway – and maybe even manage to get some NATO support for the project.
One component of the Berlin-plus formula was that NATO's defence-planning system should incorporate forces for EU-led operations. However, perceptions among NATO states as to what this means clearly diverge. Some argue that it is a question of including EU ‘defence planning’ in NATO defence planning, while others see this as an opportunity for NATO to modify its outdated and less-than-effective planning process. If NATO defence planning had been truly effective in the past, there would not have been the need for initiatives such as the DCI and the Prague Capabilities Commitment. Moreover, in Europe there would be less duplication of national assets in areas such as air-defence fighters, main battle tanks, submarines and operational staff. Defence planning continues to reflect national political priorities, not collective needs or rational cooperation. Even with future initiatives to reenergise or rationalise NATO defence planning, the priorities of national governments, and ultimately the taxpayers, are likely to prevail.
Operational planning within NATO (as opposed to defence planning) consists of contingency operations plans (COPs), concepts of operations (CONOPS) and operations plans (OPLANS). As of 2002 the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS), SACEUR and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) produced these plans at the strategic level. NATO's International Staff and International Military Staff also contribute to elements of operational planning. There is extensive expertise at NATO headquarters in planning European military crisis-management operations.11 The Combined Joint Planning Staff has been the key developer of ESDI-related concepts and has done a significant amount of work on the CJTFs and in support of the WEU. It has a formal role to provide support for ESDI/WEU operational planning.
During 2000 and 2001, the DSACEUR, Rupert Smith, and SHAPE took extraordinary steps to open NATO operational and defence planning to the EU. NATO International Staff and the US advocated a far-reaching EU-NATO collaborative defence-planning process, including all EU and NATO member states. There were also plans to open up SHAPE to all EU states. The official reason for this was to minimise duplication, but the underlying purpose was US and NATO concern that the alternative would pave the way for a separate EU defence-planning process, and separate EU operational planning, which could split NATO. The Combined Joint Planning Staff would play a complementary role as the prime operational planner for European military crisis management, including EU-led operations without any operational support from NATO.
There are essentially four options for EU-NATO operational cooperation. The first is for the EU to rely on NATO operational planning and command structures using DSACEUR and/or a CJTF headquarters, and perhaps other capabilities such as AW ACS. This option, where the EU would only provide political leadership and strategic direction, would probably be the most effective from a war-fighting and command-and-control perspective. A second option would be to employ NATO operational planning and some NATO capabilities, while using a European operational headquarters and a non-NATO chain of command. This combination could create considerable difficulties if, for instance, US support for the EU operation was placed under the operational command of a French force commander and operational headquarters. The third option is for the EU to rely on NATO operational planning without using NATO structures or capabilities in the operation. This would demand close coordination between, for example, the Combined Joint Planning Staff and the European operational headquarters. There is also the option of EU autonomous engagement, whereby the EU does not rely on NATO operational planning or military capabilities. The UK and France and their national joint operational planning HQs would play lead roles here.
For all the debate and posturing within NATO and the EU over providing NATO assets and capabilities, the alliance actually has relatively few collective assets, and not all of them can be categorised as capabilities for crisis-management operations. In 2002, the alliance collectively had 18 AW ACS, 20 stationary headquarters, two not-yet-fully operational CJTF headquarters, a research ship and a pipeline system (mainly for jet fuel). Individual member states owned all the other assets assigned or linked to NATO. SHAPE, together with the Combined Joint Planning Staff, would probably be classified as a capability that could assist an EU operation, not an asset that could be placed under EU command.
Of these collective assets and capabilities, the AW ACS and staff elements from established headquarters are of most interest for EU-led military crisis management. The CJTF headquarters have become large, heavy and US-dominated, and seem to be less attractive as lead elements for EU-led operations. NATO has no deployable land or maritime component headquarters or strategic and tactical intelligence capabilities – requirements that EU states say they need for EU operations. For operations in 2003 and 2004, NATO as such has little to offer the EU in terms of operational capabilities. It is a myth that the EU and its member states are dependant on NATO assets and capabilities; these are useful, rather than essential, as individual European states already have much of what is needed, including AW ACS, deployable headquarters and intelligence capabilities.
Inside NATO, the ‘presumption of availability’ of pre-identified capabilities and assets does not constitute a binding commitment, and decisions will be made by the NAC on a case-by-case basis. This is a weak link that may well be exploited by an opponent. With regard to national assets and capabilities, it is up to the EU, or more likely individual EU member states, to conclude bilateral agreements for loan, lease or support. Here, cooperation with the US naturally plays a central role.
What if the definition of NATO assets and capabilities expanded to include NATO formations such as the standing naval forces, the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), the NATO Response Force or ad hoc formations? Every government of participating forces in such a formation would still have to approve any participation, naturally on a case-by-case basis. A NATO force could however be coordinated inside the NATO framework and collectively offered to the EU. The ‘NATO label’ per se would have little or no operational significance – although the political signal could be substantial (giving headlines such as ‘NATO airlift task force supports the EU Operation’ or ‘EU force evacuated by NATO special forces’). It is most likely that a ‘NATO label’ would be used by the US in order to spread the political and operational risk, accentuate the role and vitality of NATO, and strengthen EU-NATO links.
Once there is agreement for NATO or NATO-coordinated support for an EU operation, what happens if the alliance or individual states providing ‘NATO support’ change their minds in the middle of the operation, or after a long commitment? for example, what happens if an EU operation evolves in a direction that does not suit the US, which has provided intelligence and transport via NATO? Could compelling national reasons lead the US to pull officers out of NATO headquarters lent to the EU operation? The impact of this would be mostly political and in terms of alliance cohesion, but there could still be serious operational ramifications.
There is also a difficult question around who would pay for the operational use of NATO assets or capabilities in EU-led operations. There is no reason why the allies should collectively foot the bill – especially since the collective NATO budget is tiny.12 Would the EU collectively pay for the NATO asset or capability, or would this be handled on a bilateral basis? Who would pay if, for example, a NATO AW ACS were shot down while supporting an EU-led operation? Another issue is the potential escalation of an EU-led operation into a NATO collective-defence operation.
Should DSACEUR (a British or German officer) be designated by the EU and NATO members as the Operation Commander or Force Commander, many formal difficulties would be avoided. By being able to play both the European and NATO card, the prospects for using the best assets and capabilities from both organisations is relatively bright. However, the role of DSACEUR vis-à-vis EU crisis management has been politicised, and will probably remain sensitive for some time to come.
While NATO military crisis management will take place only on a case-by-case basis, the EU has a permanent role in promoting stability through economic, political and military policies. The EU has no geographical restrictions.13 Although EU experience is grounded in the Balkans, operations in Asia or Africa are often mentioned as examples of future EU crisis management, and there is the option of using the forces committed to the Headline Goal in international UN operations. In addition, both the EU and NATO can lend support to international coalitions outside the formal EU or NATO framework.
The potentially wide scope of action and national interests among the key European players has complicated the process of identifying scenarios for the forces committed to the Headline Goal. As there was no agreement in the wake of the Helsinki meeting in 1999, the path of least resistance led the EU to adopt three of the WEU's Illustrated Profiles (that is, military scenarios – the same as those used in assessing the WEU Audit of Assets). The scenarios are therefore based on traditional peace-support operations of the 1990s, and are relatively conventional in nature. That does not mean that the scenarios will not be modified over time, or that new ones focusing on, for example, civil protection, civil crisis-management or counter-terrorism, will not eventually complement this traditional scope.
While the existing scenarios do not provide a sound basis for realistic operational planning or identifying needs, they do demonstrate EU member states' level of ambition and the national political interests in play. There was a strong correlation between the force requirements for the scenarios and what EU members in 1999–2002 were prepared to offer in the first place. For many, it was important that the scenarios and the subsequent force requirements reflected EU power-projection capability and/ or already identified procurement demands: the A400M transport aircraft, aircraft carriers, intelligence satellites and UAVs, cruise missiles, attack helicopters, multiple-launch rocket systems and other pet national projects. Assets had to be ‘tailored’ to European needs and European scenarios to safeguard the interests of European defence industries. Buying American assets, or depending on US capabilities, was not seen as an option in many EU capitals. Some states argued that the scenarios should be small and manageable, in order not to challenge NATO's primacy, the US role in Europe and/or national defence budgets. Others saw the scenarios as a way of pressing ahead with radical defence restructuring, increasing military capabilities, maximising national defence industrial interests or increasing defence expenditure. Even within EU states, national defence, finance and foreign ministries had very different ambitions with regard to the scenarios.
On the one hand, the US supported ambitious EU goals in order to force Europeans to fulfil the DCI, assume more of the burden in Europe and enhance Europe's ability to cooperate with the US in safeguarding mutual interests beyond the continent. On the other hand, the US did not want to encourage the ESDP and competition with NATO. US defence industrial interests were also at work. France also wanted more ambitious objectives, but to reinforce European autonomy; there was, for instance, heated debate on how many combat aircraft the EU needed for the most demanding scenario, with the French calling for a force comparable with Operation Allied Force, and the US and more cautious European states arguing for around half that.
On several occasions, NATO operational planners (who largely developed the EU scenarios and calculated which capabilities were needed) came up with results that EU capitals did not like. For instance, one scenario called for more forces or longer deployment times than permitted by the Headline Goal. In response, the parameters were simply changed: harbours were enlarged (the tiny port of Durres grew to Rotterdam-like size), the quality of roads improved (dirt roads became multi-lane highways), or the level of hostilities reduced to fit member states' interests and policies.14 This resulted in the development of scenarios that were less than realistic, and of limited value as a basis for operational planning.
The ‘Assistance to Civilians’ scenario dealt with refugee flows, humanitarian aid and the evacuation of EU nationals at a distance of 10,000 km from Brussels. The environment was largely permissive, but enforcement measures could be required. The reaction time would be short. The scenario resembled Operation Alba in 1997 or a small UNPROFOR, and tasks included area security and ensur-ing freedom of movement, information operations, humanitarian assistance and providing support for international agencies and evacuation operations.
The land component would require a divisional force of up to 9,000 troops (with a pool of 60,000 should the need arise), and would include armoured troops, mechanised infantry, air-mobile and armoured cavalry, artillery, special forces and psychological-operations troops. The air component would call for defensive counter-air, SEAD and close air support. Supporting air assets would include AW ACS aircraft, air-to-air refuelling and combat search and rescue. Electronic intelligence, signals intelligence and airborne command, control and communications (ABCCC) and electronic-warfare forces would also be required. Maritime assets would range from carrier battle groups and amphibious shipping to submarines.
The ‘Conflict Prevention/Preventive Deployment’ scenario called for expeditious and firm enforcement of a peace settlement. The scenario put the crisis at 4,000 km from Brussels. The environment was again permissive, but the force had to be capable of enforcement and securing the region. Police and civilian support would complement the corps-sized military element. This scenario implied that the EU should control a crisis area, thus paving the way for a peace process and the return of displaced people and refugees. The scenario could be compared with IFOR/SFOR, or KFOR after 1999. The forces required included a military police brigade, eight combat brigades, carrier battle groups and amphibious groups, UAVs, electronic intelligence and a considerable stra-tegic reserve.
This was the most demanding scenario.15 It required the EU to occupy a region 4,000 km from Brussels, and force two warring parties to accept a dictated peace. The environment was non-permissive and the risk high. The war-like situation precluded civil-military cooperation. Although Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia in August-September 1995 was not as complex, dangerous or large, it gives an impression of the EU scenario.16 The scenario is thus more demanding than the IFOR entry operation in autumn 1995, or the KFOR entry operation in June 1999.
The corps-level land force (60,000 troops plus 3,400 for an emergency evacuation operation) would include some 17 brigades, nine of which would be manoeuvre brigades (plus artillery, air-defence and support brigades). The force would also have attack helicopters. Although the scenario was ‘land-heavy’, the air component would be extensive, requiring up to 300 aircraft. It would be offensive in nature, and include all-weather strike capabilities, SEAD, offensive air and close air support, electronic warfare and ABCCC elements. The maritime component, requiring some 75 ships, would be diverse in order to deal with sea control, maritime embargo and air support for amphibious forces. The scenario called for substantial strategic reserves.
There were discrepancies between the NATO input and the proposed Force Requirements and those adopted by the EU ahead of the Capabilities Commitment Conference. NATO's technical advice did not call for intelligence or communication satellites. This may indicate that NATO staff or the US did not want to provide clear support for French and/or German satellite developments that would decrease European dependence on the US. The size and weight of the forces needed for the high-end scenario imply that Europe would be dependent on the US for several assets, such as heavy strategic airlift capable of transporting tanks. Furthermore, Europe will not own ABCCC or major combat search and rescue capabilities, or sufficient SEAD, precision-guided munitions and air-to-air refuelling for a large operation on a par with US/NATO speed and risk levels by 2003. It would be in the United States7 and NATO's interest to persuade the Europeans to acquire such assets and capabilities.
The EU's assets and capabilities for autonomous strategic decisionmaking, planning and intelligence are scarce. This is a limiting factor in conflict prevention, crisis management and cooperation with the US.17 Although the EU has a well-established strategic decision-making capability for elements of the First Pillar (EU relations within the CFSP framework), effective decision-making for inter-governmental crisis management is unproven. Processes are still being put in place, and there is unlikely to be a true strategic decision-making capability for crisis management until the EU has engaged in one or two major crises. The role of the EU's ESDP structures vis-à-vis national capitals, and how effective coordination will be between member states, will depend not only on the crisis in question and the varying national interests involved, but also on what added value the common ESDP structures can offer. In relation to the US, effective EU decision-making in the CFSP and ESDP framework is essential. If the EU cannot speak with one voice, and act quickly with cohesion and efficiency in coordinating economic, diplomatic and military elements, it will be a less attractive partner to the US.
For EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities, the EU Summit in Nice stated that operational planning would be carried out by NATO (SHAPE and the Combined Joint Planning Staff). In practice, this means that the EU would formally lead the operation, but that NATO would handle all the planning and command arrangements (probably through DSACEUR). US influence would be substantial as long as US and NATO assets were used, and EU autonomy would be nil. Such an arrangement may not be a problem in EU-US or EU-NATO cooperation, but it would be an issue if the EU member states must, or want to, act on their own.
For autonomous EU operations, the EU Military Staff would be tasked with setting the operational parameters at the strategic level.18 Europe should accordingly develop a capability to plan for the whole spectrum of Petersberg tasks, an objective that will take several years to realise.19 For any operational planning, the EU Military Staff will have to duplicate substantial parts of the planning elements of SHAPE and the Combined Joint Planning Staff. The EU would rely heavily on British and French operational joint planning capabilities. To manage an EU operation, the EU Military Staff will have to develop structures to link the SG/HR and Political and Security Committee, and indirectly the EU Commission and the member states, to the Operations Commander.20 Multinationality, where all participating member states have representation at all levels, is not easy and not always especially effective – albeit necessary in EU or alliance operations. For small and relatively simple operations, a tactical headquarters such as the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), under the EU flag, or a EUROCORPS augmented with joint expertise and liaison officers, could also play a lead role in operational planning.
Intelligence poses a major challenge. For the foreseeable future, the EU as an institution will not have credible intelligence input or output for strategic decision-making, operational assessments or operational command. Assets and capabilities are essentially limited to the small Joint Situation Centre, the EU Military Staff and the Satellite Centre (with most raw input coming from commercial satellites and the French-Spanish-Italian Helios I reconnaissance satellites). Even with the addition of national capabilities, the geographical scope of intelligence gathering and the likely depth of EU-wide assessments will not match the ambitions of the CFSP or the Headline Goal scenarios. Although there is extensive bilateral intelligence cooperation across the Atlantic, and also within Europe, the prospects of US or bilateral intelligence being made directly available to the EU seem remote. EU member states will continue to rely on US intelligence and little will be available at the EU level. EU CFSP/ESDP structures will be dependent on national assessments that have been ‘washed’ for EU consumption, delivered sporadically and voluntarily. Significant national intelligence is generally only released in the case of a specific threat or crisis, and little is channelled to the EU for more forward-looking pre-crisis conflict prevention, or for potential threats such as terrorism. Thus, current structures and processes are not a basis for strategic decision-making and operational control.
Only when European trust and cooperation enables genuine intelligence sharing among all member states will the EU be able to compete with, and manage relatively well without, US technical assistance for traditional crisis management. In practice, European states have yet to achieve equally close relations with their neighbours in the intelligence field as they have with the US. On the technical side, the small number of European higher-end intelligence sensors, such as satellites, comprise only a fraction of what the EU needs in order to plan and to take decisions autonomously.
The EU's most influential tools for affecting international stability are non-military, most notably economic measures backed by diplomacy. The EU accounts for 20% of global trade and 30% of the world's industrial production, provides 50% of all humanitarian aid and accounts for 60% of worldwide development aid. When national assets and capabilities are added, the EU has a potentially huge array of tools for projecting stability.21
Even before a crisis occurs, the EU can use economic instruments such as trade, tariffs and subsidies, loan policies, foreign aid, refugee management and immigration policy to exert influence. Democracy and human-rights support, arms control, de-mining and state-building are all important. Police missions, diplomatic contacts, defence diplomacy, observer missions, sharing intelligence and promoting the rule of law are also instruments of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. Together with other institutions such as the UN and NATO, the combined and coordinated effort of the EU's member states could have a considerable impact. In the case of counter-terrorism in the wake of 11 September, for instance, the EU's broad palette of economic and diplomatic instruments has proved useful and relevant, both for short-term initiatives and for long-term prevention efforts. This does not compete or challenge the US or NATO, or diminish the role of states and bilateral ties.
Emergency relief or civil protection in the wake of natural or man-made disasters is another tool of EU crisis management, which can be applied either within the EU itself, or globally. This element should include both non-military and military capabilities, which should be closely coordinated. Apart from counter-terrorism, threats or challenges such as international crime, drug-trafficking, people-smuggling, the illegal flow of money, goods and people and issues such as technology transfers also demand collective approaches as part of a common foreign and security policy. Many elements of civilian crisis management are equally relevant for internal and external security.
There are five principal challenges facing EU civilian crisis management. All are manageable, though some will probably only be dealt with in the face of an acute crisis. Although it is too early to be certain, the events of 11 September may constitute such an event. The EU Convention may also add unexpected momentum in this field.
The first challenge is structural, and relates to the internal rivalry between the European Council, the SG/HR and the European Commission. As in any large organisation, personalities and turf battles have a significant impact on practical cooperation.
The second challenge concerns the functional coordination of the vast array of CFSP/ESDP components across the three EU pillars and the various directorates, secretariats and power-centres. Since some elements, such as counter-terrorism or civil protection, are equally relevant for internal and external security, this could complicate coordination. Furthermore, decision-making procedures and the respective roles of member states and EU organs differ between the EU's various pillars.
Third, few member states have a deep-seated interest in multinational civilian crisis management, and few have a defined policy in this area. Often, civilian crisis management is not high-profile and rarely makes for spectacular headlines. Its success is difficult to measure, and a conflict prevented is essentially a non-event in the eyes of the media and the general public. In relation to other categories of crisis management, conflict prevention will always compete for interest and resources.22 Above all, there is little domestic support for sending scarce resources such as police officers, doctors, judges, prosecutors, engineers and money elsewhere. An added complication for national coordination is the fact that the assets belong to different ministries, individual federal states, counties and cities. Even with the EU Rapid Reaction Mechanism for financing civilian crisis management, long-term financing would be challenging for most governments. Developing such capabilities is hampered by difficulties in signing contracts with civilians, as there are challenging national training require-ments, on-call arrangements and insurance issues. International interoperability and training is yet another problem, and it is often much easier to let non-governmental organisations do the job.
Fourth, there is a general reluctance to link military and civilian assets. Although the WEU made some headway on this point, many European armed forces fear that their professionalism and war-fighting expertise are threatened by further civilian cooperation. Conversely, civilians are sometimes concerned that they will be ‘tainted’ by involvement with uniformed personnel/combatants. Finally, there is no culture of EU preventive engagement, and the function will remain embryonic for some time.