The prospects for increasing European capabilities for conflict prevention and the management of international crises are good. The question is how significant the increase will be, in what time-frame it will be effected and which focus further capability initiatives will have.
Despite good intentions and a legion of NATO and EU military capability initiatives, progress is slow. Over the next five years or so, it is unlikely that the increase in capabilities will be anything more than marginal. It takes time to build platforms and equipment, to train personnel and to build a military capability – regardless of increases in defence expenditure. Only marginal capability increases are in the procurement pipeline, and a significant increase in Europe's defence expenditure is not feasible under current political conditions. On the contrary, defence expenditure will continue to decrease in many European states. For many voters and governments, it makes sense to take money away from defence and spend it on the police (for counter-terrorism and international operations), foreign aid, domestic civil protection against natural disasters, or even healthcare. The opportunities for greater and more relevant output lie in the field of national reprioritisation and European coordination.
The sum of the capabilities committed to the Headline Goal catalogue is substantial, and Europe will be able to do much on its own. However, because member states lack a handful of capabilities they say they need for the most demanding or geographically distant scenarios, the full Headline Goal ambitions will not be met by late 2003, or indeed for much of the decade. On the other hand, EU members have set their own goals, interpreted them and developed scenarios, and then identified which assets and capabilities would be needed to meet the most challenging situations. The flaws in military capabilities add an incentive for national defence procurement – particularly for those EU member states that have retained major defence-industrial capacities.
The outlook is more promising for the non-military elements of crisis management. Given the EU's low starting point, any increase is bound to be significant. The potential for development in this field is huge. The EU's goals, ranging from police capacity and state-building to civil protection and elements of conflict prevention, will probably be met by late 2003.
These outcomes are not, however, pre-determined, and Europe could substantially increase its capacities even in the medium term, and could do so at little expense. The greatest potential for significantly increasing Europe's capabilities lies in the following areas: enhanced strategic decision-making; intelligence coordination; the development of Europe's conventional military capabilities through increased coordination; national and functional coordination within the Union; and pragmatic EU–NATO and EU–US cooperation.
The EU's conflict-prevention and crisis-management capabilities would be significantly increased if its strategic decision-making were enhanced. To achieve this calls for centralised EU coordination of the economic, diplomatic and military and non-military elements of conflict prevention and crisis management, and a single European voice. Realistically, there will not be a common foreign and security policy on every issue in international relations, but there may be room for a common European approach in many, if not most, cases. Even so, centralised EU coordination will not and cannot replace bilateral ties between states within the EU, and across the Atlantic. Strategic EU coordination would be a complement, but not a substitute, for existing ties.
Ideally, one body should coordinate all elements of the ESDP and external relations with states and regions in potential areas of crisis. Only when trade, diplomatic initiatives, loan policies, national and EU threat-reduction schemes, national NGO initiatives and regional relations and crisis-management tools are dynamically linked can conflict prevention be successful – whatever the challenge. Furthermore, this body should coordinate crisis management and intelligence, including monitoring potential and ongoing crises, bilateral military cooperation, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism and arms and technology transfers. Such a body must grasp long-term capability development, defence-industrial cooperation and policy coordination and development within the EU. Only when these elements are tied together can the EU's capability in conflict prevention and crisis management reach its full potential.
Enhanced strategic decision-making is not just needed in times of crisis. Coordination should be the day-to-day norm in order to contribute to stability projection in the pre-crisis phase. There is much to recommend the Political and Security Committee, complemented by relevant Commission and Third Pillar representatives, as this key coordination structure – a European Security Council with joint national and functional representation. (The actual name of this council is not important, but the function is.) The SG/HR, representing competence and continuity, would be a natural chair for such a body.1 The challenge is to secure the support of the Commission and the SG/HR and General Secretariat of the Council, and to persuade national capitals, particularly London, Paris and Berlin, to hand such an important task to a body in distant Brussels.
A wider body than the current Political and Security Committee is needed because many of the threats and challenges that the EU will face will demand the involvement of the Commission and the EU's legal/police elements. Effective counter-terrorism demands that policies relating to border control are linked with police coordination. At the same time, trade, loans and sanctions can encourage third countries to cooperate. These efforts may be coupled with military threat assessments from the General Secretariat of the Council and member states, and with military and civilian crisis-management elements that deal with terrorism outside the EU. Regional instability in the Middle East or North Africa, for instance, would call for sophisticated and complex management, using all conflict-prevention and crisis-management elements at the disposal of the EU and its members. One crisis may initially be dealt with in the Second Pillar, and then involve the First and then the Third; another may first involve the Commission, then the CFSP and military and civilian crisis-management elements as it develops.
The boundaries between military and civilian security and internal and external security are more fluid and institutions and states must develop new structures and processes to meet this reality. A joint Security Council where the Political and Security Committee is in the lead and the other two pillars are represented could be a cost-effective, useful instrument for increased security.2 The only rational alternative to increased coordination across the pillars is to amalgamate the EU pillars altogether.
In terms of the technicalities, the decision-making Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) would hand over much of its decision-shaping and coordination function in conflict prevention and crisis management to the Political and Security Committee. In the long term, the EU would benefit from having just one body, thus giving a joint cross-pillar Security Council improved decision-making powers. The national representatives on the Political and Security Committee should be given stronger mandates by their governments for quicker decision-making. The question of who is to have what vote in a future EU Security Council is sensitive. The CFSP remains inter-governmental, though a voice, and perhaps a vote, should be given to the other two pillars. The fact that a Security Council would be large, particularly after further EU enlargement, makes consensus-building challenging, and much will depend on the chairman and his staff. On the other hand, the large number of countries represented, plus the weight of the other two pillars, would give the Security Council significant international legitimacy and clout.
The Political and Security Committee will need to develop a more effective support staff. To an extent, such mechanisms and structures already exist in the General Secretariat of the Council, not least in the tiny but important Policy Unit and Joint Situation Centre. These need to be enhanced, as does the role of the SG/HR. Developing policy input for the Political and Security Committee should be a major focus. The SG/HR and General Secretariat of the Council should produce political contingency plans for all conceivable areas of activity, and should support national representatives on the Political and Security Committee in achieving consensus among member states. Key functions include early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for medium- to long-term conflict prevention and crisis management, including preventive diplomacy and deployments. The SG/HR and the Political and Security Committee /EU Security Council should spend considerable time looking at latent crises, and challenges that may develop into crises months or years ahead. Long-term conflict prevention is rarely glamorous and always difficult to sell politically, but rational and financially sound. More time and effort should be spent by the Political and Security Committee and the SG/HR (and in the future the proposed EU Security Council) on developing democracy, trade, tolerance and the rule of law, expanding contacts through defence diplomacy and supporting regional security and military cooperation and peacekeeping capabilities in areas of concern beyond the EU.
The Political and Security Committee and the SG/HR should also broaden their international points of contact. Direct ties through liaison offices and exchanges should be established with major international organisations such as the UN, the OSCE, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).3 In principle, these organisations should be informed of all CFSP and ESDP matters, and they should have the opportunity to make contributions.
The relationship between the EU and the US should be given priority, and the input of the US welcomed in matters relating to the CFSP and decision-shaping processes. Transatlantic dialogue, including the New Transatlantic Agenda, should be complemented by bilateral ties (liaison personnel and exchanges) with the Political and Security Committee and the SG/HR and staff elements, primarily the Policy Unity, DGE VIII, the Military Staff and the Military Committee. Although priorities and principles may vary, EU member states should have nothing to hide from the US, and vice-versa. On the contrary, the EU must actively seek coordination and dialogue with the US in all international pre-crisis and crisis matters, ranging from areas of concern and ongoing operations to managing common threats. General coordination of long-term stability projection, plus trade and aid, is particularly important. Again, counter-terrorism and conflict prevention have enormous potential if the EU and the US can develop assessments, share ideas and form compatible policies. Although the US has no formal voice in the EU, just as the EU has none in Washington, ideas should flow freely between them as a matter of course. In addition, EU candidate states and Russia should have liaison officers tied to the General Secretariat of the Council, and via their capitals, and should be invited to contribute ideas and to coordinate with the EU.4
This does not mean that the EU should become a chaotic forum in which all international organisations, NGOs and states voice their grievances and concerns, thereby paralysing EU decision-making. But it does mean that the EU CFSP/ESDP structures should listen to other players and, where consistent with the policy of EU members, seek policy coordination and practical cooperation. In practical terms, the Political and Security Committee and the SG/HR could establish hearings and selected working groups in order to channel external input and support coordination.
Initiatives like these call for an enlarged SG/HR Policy Unit, an increased Military and CFSP/ESDP staff and more effective coordination mechanisms with the Commission and national representatives in Brussels. The cost of these enhanced support functions, divided by the number of EU members, is a small price to pay.5 Establishing these processes can be quickly arranged if there is agreement in London, Paris and Berlin. Although it would take several years before the processes became truly effective, they would significantly increase the EU's capability. The price would lie in loss of national prestige and the option to ‘go it alone’ – particularly among the more influential EU states.
EU intelligence is needed at two levels – the strategic decision-making level and the operational level – and for two purposes – long-term conflict prevention and active crisis management. In the near future, Europe will need a comprehensive intelligence function for strategic decision-making. With hindsight, such a function could have played an important role in the wake of the September 2001 attacks in the US and the subsequent counter-terrorism campaign. The capability will be paramount in addressing instability and future change in the Middle East. There is a demand for intelligence by the SG/HR (and the Policy Unit), the EU Council (and its Political and Security Committee) and the European Commission. The HHC contains a ‘requirement’ for an intelligence division under the Military Staff – but this is not of the right calibre.
There is a need for an intelligence unit at the political level, preferably directly under the chairman of the Political and Security Committee and the SG/HR, and closely linked with the Policy Unit.6 An embryonic capability exists in the Joint Situation Centre, but it is questionable whether this is developing quickly enough, or is sufficiently ambitious. Ideally, the EU intelligence function, in both size and role, should be modelled on the UK's Joint Intelligence Committee.
It is important that EU central intelligence is civilian-led, that it has a multifaceted analysis capability, that it is focused on pre-crisis conflict prevention and has direct access to policy makers. Its task would be to support the ESDP structures and the Political and Security Committee (or a future EU Security Council) in order to increase the coordination and output of the wide palette of EU tools for conflict prevention. Without such an analysis capability the ESDP structures, including the Political and Security Committee, depend on national intelligence assessments alone.
Apart from traditional military intelligence (which should be a minor function), the EU intelligence function would have a wider scope, and include humanitarian, economic and political elements and related assessments, ranging from cyber-threats, terrorism and organised crime to weapons' proliferation. Since risk perceptions differ across the Atlantic, it is important for Europe to produce its own risk assessments.
For both the pre-crisis and crisis phases, input would be channelled via member states' own intelligence and diplomatic services, EU Military Committee representatives and the Satellite Centre. Valuable input pertaining to political, economic, industrial and legal circumstances in states with relations with the EU can also be gleaned from the relevant commission directorates. Open-source intelligence and assessments from independent think-tanks would complement these sources. The key is for the EU to have a sizeable and autonomous analysis body that can produce original and relevant assessments. Security is a concern, but if the top secret standard can be maintained in SHAPE and the NATO Combined Joint Planning Staff, there is no reason why such standards could not be maintained among professionals working with EU intelligence.
The EU intelligence function should also act as a forum for temporary or extraordinary cooperation among national experts. Whether it be a crisis in Macedonia, unrest in a North African state, pre-crisis long-term stability projection or counter-terrorism, national intelligence experts could be pooled at the EU level. These experts should be pre-identified, and should function as informal working groups, together with the EU's permanent intelligence staff. This would allow ad hoc intelligence coordination and networking among member states and between national and EU experts, and would also contribute intelligence to the EU national representatives and the ESDP structures.
Increased intelligence coordination is also necessary for reasons of operational safety. Member states' intelligence has to be channelled to the EU during an operation; it would be disastrous if soldiers from a member state were killed, and it later transpired that intelligence which could have avoided the casualties had been withheld by another member state.7
As Charles Grant argues, there is no reason why the EU, via an EU intelligence function, could not develop a bilateral relationship with the US.8 This would make the US feel included, dispel rumours, and pave the way for a flow of intelligence assessments where there are common interests and, at the least, compatible policies. Such cooperation would be a natural part of any strategic partnership.
An EU intelligence function would be rational and potentially highly effective. Much intelligence relating to the Balkans, for instance, is endlessly circulated in European capitals. There is a risk that intelligence coming from the same source (often American) is modified each time it changes hands. The more outdated information becomes, the greater the damage if it proves inaccurate. Today there is massive duplication of European national intelligence capabilities, not least in areas where national interests are less than vital. If the Europeans could share a portion of basic intelligence relating to areas of potential crises, resources could be channelled towards deeper and more focused assessments.
The sensitive issue of intelligence cooperation, the danger of national interpretations and slants, differing national agendas and interests and their effect on national and EU assessments – all will mean that an EU intelligence function, let alone EU–US cooperation, will be challenging. In some ways, a relatively autonomous EU intelligence function under the Political and Security Committee/Security Council will compete with national intelligence services, and the ‘ownership’ of intelligence and sources could become tricky. Few intelligence services wish to give more attention to European cooperation if this drains resources from their relationship with the US. However, greater openness within an EU framework and increased competition in producing original and relevant data will, in the long term, improve the quality of European intelligence services and European security overall. Meetings among EU member states' directors of military intelligence are a step in the right direction, though the real experts also need to meet and exchange views. It is up to governments to force intelligence services to cooperate and contribute more directly to the CFSP and ESDP.
For an EU intelligence function to be effective and relevant, it would have to have authority, integrity and the respect of the other EU institutions and member states. Its staff would have to be community-funded and recruited directly by the General Secretariat of the Council. Intelligence services would most likely require liaison officers to convey (and translate) sensitive information to those producing the assessments – not dissimilar from the process developed for military intelligence conveyed to the EU Military Staff. To produce new and uniquely relevant intelligence, an EU intelligence body would probably require a minimum of around 100 intelligence experts, excluding national liaison officers and support staff. A clear political directive by EU member states will be vital to the running of the intelligence function, the formulation of intelligence requirements and the national fulfilment of intelligence commitments.
On the hardware side, the EU should also develop its strategic reconnaissance capability. At least a handful of satellites is needed in order to have the ability to verify US intelligence, add a modest autonomous capability and contribute to transatlantic intelligence-gathering in both the conflict-prevention and crisis-management phases. The development of coordinated human intelligence, UAVs, aerial reconnaissance, European air-based ground-surveillance radar, special forces and signals intelligence would give the EU a better operational intelligence capability. Individual EU members and the EU as an institution must have processed and unprocessed intelligence, as well as analysis and assessments, to trade with the US.
Even with the political will to create an EU intelligence function and the establishment of security arrangements, operational cooperation and trust would still take time to develop. Even under favourable conditions, perhaps generated by an acute need for cooperation during a crisis such as the counter-terrorist campaign in 2001 and 2002, it would probably take 5–10 years for EU intelligence coordination to become effective. The development of US–EU cooperation is therefore important, not only for the benefit of European security and the transatlantic link, but also because there is little option in the short to medium term. It is, however, important to note that the development of a relatively autonomous EU intelligence analysis capability is a contribution to transatlantic burden-sharing (both old and new), and does not diminish existing bilateral intelligence cooperation across the Atlantic.
The quest is for greater and more relevant output. The institutional label of the initiatives or forces is less important.
In the military field, it will be important to maintain the momentum of the DCI, the Prague Capabilities Commitment, and the Headline Goal towards deployability, sustainability, effective engagement, survivability, command-and-control systems and interoperability. Whatever the initiative, military forces should become more flexible, potent and better supported for crisis management than they are today. Improvement will not be spectacular or quick, but it will gradually enhance the EU, NATO and the transatlantic strategic partnership. It is also important that Europe acquires the assets and capabilities it needs – not what the US would like Europe to develop. European taxpayers and governments alone decide what is value for money.
The greatest ‘new’ output will come from those countries that have so far failed to move beyond the old concept of stationary territorial defence, and from those countries that have yet to form deployable, effective and sustainable capabilities for crisis-management operations. Forces must have dual roles [EU/national/homeland]: Security and defence and international crisis management. Once reforms are complete, the armed forces in Spain, Italy, Poland and Germany will produce significantly increased capabilities for the EU, and will reduce the reliance on France and the UK.
EU coordination in armaments development and procurement should, at least in theory, be one of the best ways to build new capabilities. Under the ESDP, the EU's national armaments directors meet regularly and the institutionalisation of this format, a European Armaments Agency, makes sense. Cooperation is further developed within the ECAP framework. However, this element of the ESDP has at the same time been one of its least rewarding aspects. National prestige, industry concerns and the need to preserve jobs mean that this is a highly political issue. Coordination within the EU challenges other established defence-cooperation forums (WEAG, OCCAR and the separate defence-industrial cooperation under the ‘letter-of-intent’ process among the EU's six largest defence producers).
Intensified defence-industrial cooperation is nonetheless essential to the ESDP, and crucial if Europe is to increase its military capabilities. There is massive duplication and over-capacity in Europe's defence industries, and quality is frequently lower than in the US. Only through further consolidation, greater competition and more standardised products can Europe hope to increase not only quantitative capability levels, but also qualitative levels. This is also a prerequisite for healthy transatlantic defence procurement.9 Only when Europe is competitive is the US likely to take it seriously in both the security and defence-industrial arenas.
François Heisbourg has observed that deficiencies in European capabilities are not due to inadequate overall defence spending.10 EU member states spent 173.5bn euros ($156bn) on defence in 2001.11 Heisbourg argues that Europeans can improve the efficiency of their defence spending by defining force goals, improving budget structures and input criteria (for example, convergence criteria) and the pooling of key capabilities.12 Given that force planning boils down to national interests, policies and priorities, there is little reason to believe that EU defence planning will significantly better NATO's in realising capabilities. Nevertheless, a ‘Europeanisation’ of defence planning and force goals is bound to occur, and could lead to a more coordinated approach to European capabilities development.
Europe has huge arsenals of assets; EU member states have almost 9,000 main battle tanks, for instance (this number more than doubles if Turkey and EU-candidate countries are included), more than 50 conventional submarines and more than 3,000 combat aircraft, but only a fraction of these assets could be categorised as capabilities for real crisis-management operations. There is thus massive duplication. The problem is that European states, most of which declare that they have moved on from the concept of conventional territorial defence, continue to invest in traditional equipment without looking at what they really need for crisis-management operations. As pooling and functional coordination is practically non-existent, any improvement through defence planning, dialogue and cooperation would be a step in the right direction.
Joint requirements and joint procurement can result in additional and cheaper assets, hopefully of a high technological standard. Above all, pooling key national capabilities could significantly increase European capabilities. It does not make sense that almost every European state has its own C-130 and/or C-160 airlift assets and full logistic support and training, however small the force. The German idea of a joint EU transport command is sound and should be developed, as should the NATO Prague Capabilities Commitment of November 2002 which called for the pooling and joint ownership of support jamming pods, air-to-air refuelling and UAVs. Leasing or buying US strategic airlift also makes sense. Pooling would also be relevant for sealift, some aircraft logistics (for the F-16, Mirage, Tornado, Eurofighter and an array of helicopters), military medical services, air and maritime control and submarine search and rescue.13 Functions such as naval and air patrols could also be coordinated, at least in sub-regions. As the protection of external borders is increasingly seen as a common mission, a standing European naval force and coast guard tasked with defence and border control may emerge.
Pooling higher military education and specialist training, and the consequent closing down of some national facilities, can save money and increase quality and interoperability. Similarly, it could be possible to merge national defence-research establishments. Although the gradual consolidation of Europe's defence industries will generate more multinational research and development, governments must seek European cooperation in research beyond multinational procurement programmes.14
Role specialisation may de facto occur in all European armed forces, but few states are prepared to develop a formal policy. Coordination and the sharing of tasks with trusted neighbours, with Benelux cooperation as a model, is a more palatable option until further European integration permits bolder steps. Sub-regional cooperation – as in EUROCORPS, EUROMARFOR, ARRC and the Nordic Brigade – adds multinational capabilities that are interoperable and relevant, while enhancing commonality and spreading political risk and cost. The NRF may prove a useful instrument not only for the rational coordination of high-readiness capabilities, but also for NATO cohesion, transatlantic interoperability and European insight into US force transformation.
Increased attention is also being paid to doctrinal, operational and technical interoperability. The development of doctrines for military crisis management is done better and more economically in a multinational framework. In general, exercises and training should increasingly be multinational – even at relatively low tactical levels. National ‘jointness’, an area in which a majority of EU member states still face enormous challenges, should develop towards multinational European ‘jointness’. NATO standardisation is, for now, the key instrument of this process, although EU operations will demand interoperability and ‘jointness’ at lower levels than are called for in traditional NATO deployments. The NRF may come to play a role even in this sense. Interoperability efforts within the alliance and Europe must be accelerated; one aspect of this is increased quality control and the tactical evaluation of capabilities committed to EU and NATO service.
Exercises may seem an obvious step towards interoperability. Although there is an EU policy in this area, it engages only EU and NATO strategic-level structures, not operational and tactical capabilities and live exercises. Military units committed to the Headline Goal, including non-NATO headquarters, should exercise together. Cooperation in the Balkans helps, but only when units exercise together can they function together immediately on deployment. This calls for specific forces and units to be assigned to the Headline Goal, not just the commitment of a force whose specific composition and field partner is decided on a case-by-case basis.15 This is an area where healthy EU-NATO cooperation can be developed in practice.
In the civilian crisis-management field, it is equally important to follow through on capability initiatives. Further steps will demand increased cooperation and coordination. Police officers for crisis-management operations are the spearhead of this cooperation, and common principles, concepts and training are being applied. Nevertheless, there is work to be done. The EU's police catalogue must differentiate between different kinds of police for different deployments. Common concepts are also being developed for rule-of-law elements. Cooperation is embryonic in EU civilian crisis management, but the potential for development is limited only by the imagination, and issues of national prestige and cost. Cooperation in the wake of national disasters in Europe has highlighted the need for coordination among neighbours, and demonstrated that some of the capabilities needed for out-of-area crisis management are equally relevant at home.
Conceptually and in practice, progress has been impressive in just a few short years. In the area of border control, the idea of a European corps of border guards is already being debated.16 Developing gendarmerie-type forces, and increasing European cooperation among them, could add an important counter-terrorism capability and a capability much in demand in peace-support operations. Capabilities cannot easily be tailored either for domestic purposes or for out-of-area operations since operational needs tend to override such definitions. Increased coordination and cooperation between border guards, coast guards, area surveillance, gendarmerie forces and the police makes sense, and prepares Europe for challenges both within and outside the Union.
Capability initiatives, both regional and pan-European alike, are also affected by EU enlargement. To give an example, the Baltic Sea region will be fundamentally transformed with the enlargement of the EU so that all states except Russia are members. Cooperation and coordination in what will become an ‘EU lake’ will in time probably affect police cooperation, border control, military environmental issues, sea and air surveillance (civilian and military), intelligence coordination, the joint monitoring of threats from organised crime and terrorists, search and rescue and practical interoperability for all elements involved. There are also significant financial and political gains to be derived from such regional coordination, not to mention advantages in European integration. As internal and external security become difficult to separate, so the need for national and regional coordination between such elements as police services, coast guards, navies and customs will increase. Just as security cooperation between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg has developed since the Second World War, so this is gradually spreading across Europe. In all probability, we have seen only the beginning. New security-related areas of cooperation are bound to emerge.
The EU also faces the challenge of linking non-military and military crisis management and developing joint capabilities in order to broaden the range of tools for managing crises. There is a need to link military and non-military crisis-management capabilities at both the strategic and the operational level. Whether or not the Political and Security Committee evolves into a EU Security Council, it must coordinate all elements of crisis management, including non-military components. The two elements should be inseparable in conceptual work, planning and operational command-and-control.17 Currently, the EU lacks any kind of command-and-control arrangement for non-military operations. Unity of command, from the political level down to the field operators, must be established across the whole crisis-management spectrum.
EU states should identify and catalogue the relevant civilian capabilities as has been done for military capabilities. Within the various categories, a minimum of standardisation and interoperability should be established between national capabilities, and between multinational capabilities. Joint training and exercises are also necessary, as is the development of day-to-day coordination mechanisms among states and between states and the EU non-military crisis-management structure.
Taking the Headline Goal idea one step further, EU civil protection and crisis management would benefit from the establishment of ‘Reaction Packages’. For example, readily-available Packages should be tailored to emergency relief in the wake of natural or man-made disasters, both within the EU and externally. This may involve linking national and international NGOs and relief agencies with civilian and military medical support, military engineering, search-and-rescue capabilities and military transport. Some Packages could be based on modular rapid-reaction police forces, while others could focus on civil emergencies, medical or search-and-rescue (non-military and military) operations. Pre-crisis state-building elements should also be available in ‘Package’ form. Another niche could be threat-reduction teams for detection and monitoring, or joint teams dealing with radiological, biological or chemical terrorist attacks. Post-crisis detoxification and sanitisation is another field. Fact-finding teams and several of the Reaction Packages must be capable of reacting immediately.
At the higher end of the crisis spectrum, there should be Reaction Packages for initial deployments of humanitarian missions, evacuation operations, peace-support operations and post-conflict state-building. The scenarios for such contingencies exist, but not the pre-identification of capabilities earmarked for them. Some Reaction Packages would contain mainly conventional military capabilities, while others would focus on unconventional warfare, including special forces (both military and police) for counter-terrorism operations or countering asymmetrical threats. Naturally some capabilities or functions can be earmarked for more than one Package, at least to a certain extent and as long as a level of interoperability is guaranteed.
Size and readiness would naturally vary. Large combat-capable Reaction Packages, perhaps of divisional size, could resemble NATO's joint response force or the Standing Naval Forces, although they would contain a broader range of capabilities (including non-military elements) and standards for interoperability (because of multinationality at lower levels), and pre-readiness training would need to be higher. Another such Reaction Package could be small and highly specialised, more comparable to existing US and UK special-forces cooperation or amphibious-forces cooperation between the UK and the Netherlands. Unity of command, interoperability and the sustainability of non-military and military capabilities are vital, as these would represent the EU's initial engagement forces. If modes of cooperation are established through exercises and dialogue in peacetime, the operational phase is likely to be more effective.
Establishing Reaction Packages cannot happen overnight, and there are significant costs involved as soon as the aim is high readiness. However, most of the assets and capabilities already exist, and many of the components are committed to the Helsinki Headline Goal or could be assembled with existing national capabilities. However, there needs to be more coordination. Since many threats are commonly shared, this could be best achieved in a pan-European or EU forum. Starting off with a couple of Reaction Packages would be a realistic step, and could be a suitable follow-on Headline Goal.
It may be relatively easy to generate the political will for such coordination at the central EU level. The real challenge lies with individual member states. Each government needs to ask itself whether it is prepared to go beyond the current EU commitments, commit to training and maintain in a state of readiness, deal with legal and procedural obstacles to taking quick decisions. Is there a real interest in sending non-military assets abroad and developing the capability to contribute to quick and effective decision-making in Brussels on conflict prevention and crisis management? Some governments may fear the misguided label of ‘EU Army’ that could be applied to these pre-identified, pre-trained and interoperable Reaction Packages. On the other hand, many of the challenges described above are as important within the Union as they are globally, and in most cases multinational cooperation is essential for effective engagement. The institutional label is less important than the development of coordinated European capabilities. For now, the EU looks to be the most suitable forum for such coordination, though the EU should also seek broader international cooperation. Coordination with any NATO response force or operational capability is inevitable and should be encouraged. In civil emergencies, there is every reason to build on NATO's experience in Kosovo and Macedonia. In counter-terrorism, cooperation with the US should be a priority.
A close and effective institutional working relationship between the EU and NATO would be sensible and logical. However, this will not materialise unless it is in the interests of all member states.18 EU-NATO cooperation requires not only formal agreement on the political front, but also strategic compatibility and practical arrangements, for which the identification of common strategic objectives,19 compatible procedures and over-arching priorities is key. This should be done at the highest political level.20
In an ideal world, the joint EU-NATO forum should be broadened to include all levels of cooperation, from groups of experts and ambassadors to foreign and defence ministers and heads of state and government. In areas of common interest, and where there is broad Western consensus, the joint forum should also have decision-making powers.21 The bottom line is that the EU and NATO member states should be flexible, and use whatever institution, forum or group is relevant for the issue at hand. The major drawbacks with such a forum are that it would limit ‘constructive ambiguity’ between the two institutions, for states belonging to both organisations to present only one point of view (rather than different positions for each group), and add yet another layer of decision-making. However, even if the only result is dialogue, confidence-building, institutional coordination and decision-shaping between the two institutions, European security would still benefit.22
The alternative to a close EU-NATO relationship lies in accentuated bilateral ties – first and foremost the EU-US relationship. This could be supported, for example, by augmenting the suggested EU Security Council with an American representative on a case-by-case or functional basis. Points of contact between the EU and EU-candidate countries are also important. In time – and depending on EU cohesion post enlargement, the follow-on to the ESDP, a new form of burden-sharing across the Atlantic and cooperation on issues of common concern – the EU-US relationship may become the core not only of European, but also Western, security cooperation. The EU, because of the wide spectrum of security-projecting elements at its disposal, may become a more important dialogue partner for the US than the more narrowly focused European pillar in NATO. Nevertheless, the functions and capabilities should be in focus, not institutional labels. Over the next decade or so, the wisest course is to develop both close EU-NATO and close EU-US relations, with the aim of sustaining NATO as an organisation and exploiting the many useful elements of cooperation, including the benefits of engaging non-EU NATO members in European and EU crisis management.
The EU will need to develop its own defence-planning process. Called the Capabilities Development Mechanism, this will largely mirror NATO's defence-planning process. Just as in NATO, there is a need within the EU to link collective goals and scenarios to force catalogues, procurement and operationalising capabilities, and progress reviews. Three challenges should be addressed.
First, while it will be difficult to merge the two defence-planning processes or integrate EU defence planning into NATO's, it would nonetheless make sense if both the EU and NATO member states could at least identify compatible political goals (NATO Ministerial Guidance and EU Headline Goals), directions and priorities. Differences relating to strategic and operational needs (for example, different requirements for strategic intelligence and deployment range and different roles in territorial defence) and different linkages to defence-industrial policies and national agendas ought to be manageable as long as the aim is compatibility, not trying to make the two processes identical or one and the same. At the very least, the two defence-planning cycles should be synchronised and the processes should be parallel. When it comes to EU and NATO defence planning, there should be nothing to hide between the two organisations and, although non-member decision-shaping in defence planning may be limited, transparency and compatibility should be complete.
Just as has been the case for NATO, the EU process must permit opt-outs, without individual states being able to obstruct cooperation among the majority. In the case of obstruction by a minority, an alternative for those states that want to cooperate is to create a defence-planning process which is formally separate from the EU and NATO, but which uses the same mechanism and processes.
Second, in practical crisis management contacts between the EU and NATO should be developed at all levels and in all possible forums – particularly between military staff and the decision-making bodies. The alternative, should individual states obstruct such dialogue, is to create ad hoc arrangements outside the EU or NATO, or to use bilateral and multilateral contacts. Although this would damage institutional cohesion, it would also permit pragmatic and sensible cooperation.
Third, it is the responsibility of the individual member states, not the institutions, to produce the capabilities required. Although institutional staff can coordinate national defence planning and provide collective processes, every state will remain loyal to its own national interests and domestic agendas. As each state has only one defence-planning process, one set of forces and one procurement budget, it is up to individual nations to ensure that the substance of the two defence-planning processes remains the same, even though the two processes may cater to different roles and goals.
At the operational level, once the political decision has been made to initiate planning and to invite non-members to participate, all states engaged in an operation should be involved. This could mean troop contributors from non-NATO EU members participating in NATO planning, or non-EU NATO member states in EU planning. To safeguard NATO's valuable capability in operational planning, SHAPE and the Combined Joint Planning Staff should be opened up to non-NATO EU members, which should enjoy a status similar to that of the French, with national representatives in Mons. Differing transatlantic operational agendas and intelligence assessments may prove a challenge, but increased European intelligence capabilities and US-EU intelligence cooperation should minimise the problem.
Ideally, NATO and EU operational planning should be amalgamated and a formula found to ensure that no one member state can stop the others from cooperating. European operational planning could be produced by NATO staff – as long as the staff can also produce autonomous EU operational alternatives and credibly serve the EU without a US/NATO political slant. Effective contacts should be established between the EU Military Staff, the Combined Joint Planning Staff and the prime European operational headquarters. The principle of reciprocity is important. Just as the EU can rely on NATO assets and capabilities, so NATO must be able to count on EU assets and capabilities. Special arrangements would have to be made for NATO's Article 5 and nuclear planning.
This paper does not advocate the development of a European joint-operations headquarters akin to SHAPE in its calibre and role. As long as there is guaranteed access by the EU and all its member states to SHAPE, the Combined Joint Planning Staff and related capabilities, there is little reason for duplication. However, if that is not the case, a ‘Euro-SHAPE’ may well be developed in the longer term. The advantage would be not having to rely on the veto of non-EU NATO members; and within the union, not to have to rely on a UK-, French- or German-dominated national operational headquarters. A European HQ should be able to handle both civilian and military crisis-management capabilities, a point that will become increasingly important the more military and civilian crisis-management capabilities are coordinated at the strategic and operational level. If such a European HQ was purely military, it would compete with SHAPE and only complicate common operational perceptions and planning transparency. The main challenge with a European HQ would lie in operational cooperation with the US. US cooperation through both SHAPE and a European HQ sounds complicated, but may be manageable.
EU-NATO cooperation is not technically or practically difficult – the obstacles are purely political. Theoretically, if there is the political will, then effective EU-NATO cooperation could be established, even in the short term.