Between them, the EU and the US are home to 650m people, have a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of over $18,000 billion, representing 58% of world GDP, and account for more than 40% of the international trade in goods and services. In many, perhaps most, aspects of security and defence, including crisis management, the interests of Europeans and Americans coincide, even if policies, values, approaches and priorities may differ.1
Formal cooperation between the EU and the US is based on the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990. The New Transatlantic Agenda was adopted in 1995, and a follow-up is in preparation. Points of contact range from summit meetings and senior-level groups to working groups and meetings of experts. Since 1995, the dialogue has developed from consultations towards cooperation and joint action plans. Although a significant portion of the dialogue is on trade, the agenda has for several years included issues like the ESDP, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism, as well as the global challenges of energy, the environment and HIV/AIDS. In all probability, EU-US forums and points of contact will develop into an even closer relationship - particularly where interests and threat perceptions converge.
The US has generally viewed the ESDP and European relations through the lens of NATO.2 The ESDP has been seen as controversial, and as posing a threat to NATO and US influence in Europe. The debate became particularly lively with the launch of the Headline Goal.3 EU statements of ‘autonomy’ and ‘self-sustain-ability’, and individual states' talk of European ‘first choice’, ‘emancipation’, ‘independence’ and ‘Western bi-polarity’, reflected ambitions and visions that could be seen as threatening to the Cold War institutional setting, or as paving the way for a new transatlantic security arrangement. Whatever happens in Europe, for political and economic reasons the US does not have the option of retreating from European affairs.4 At the same time, its reservations about the ESDP will continue for some time to come.5
As most Western European states are members of both NATO and the EU (giving these states a de facto ‘double veto’), they can remain Atlanticists while also being staunchly European.6 This initially unsettled and puzzled the US.7 As Nicole Gnesotto observes, the US has a problem with Europe becoming too parasitic, and also with it becoming too equal.8 It is a matter of perspective whether the US or the Europeans have most at stake in NATO.9
Nonetheless, the EU and the US seem to have reached a new level in their relations. The change comes from two directions. The first is the fact that the ESDP has fundamentally altered the institutional setting, and the shape of the transatlantic link. The second is that it suits the US for the Europeans to take increasing responsibility for their own security, while the US focuses on new priorities such as homeland defence.10 This does not mean that the US does not care about Europe, that NATO is obsolete or that transatlantic ties are cut. But it does signal a new transatlantic relationship, where the US and Europe cooperate foremost on a global level, fighting common threats and defending common interests. The ESDP and the US focuses on homeland defence are not about strategic disengagement, nor are they a question of choosing between NATO and the ESDP. Rather, they mean developing new relations outside of the traditional transatlantic link, based on trade, shared strategic interests and common objectives in conflict prevention and stability.
Arguably, the autonomous decision-making capabilities that the EU is developing are no more dramatic or damaging to NATO than US decision-making autonomy. EU autonomy will make the European pillar within NATO stronger, and autonomy is a normal part of a strategic partnership of equals. In reality, Europe will not stand alone any more than the US will, and cooperation will thrive as long as it benefits both partners. Almost nobody wants NATO to dissolve, and almost all the European states genuinely want a strong alliance, a strong CFSP/ESDP and healthy links with the US. Squaring this circle will at times be challenging, but far from impossible. There are some real differences, over trade, multilateralism, arms control, the role of the UN, the pre-emptive use of force, the death penalty, or multilateral initiatives such as the Kyoto Protocol or the International Criminal Court (ICC). The challenge lies in managing these disputes without allowing individual issues to taint the core of cooperative responsibilities and shared interests.
One of the key challenges concerns how the US perceives burden-sharing. The ESDP represents a new form of burden-sharing, rendering the traditional debate on this question obsolete.11 The US has traditionally focused on persuading the Europeans to increase their defence spending and fulfil the DCI, rather than encouraging restructuring, reform or multinational coordination.12 In 2001, the US DoD argued that ‘unresponsive defense budgets pose a risk of stagnating or, even worse, eroding Alliance capabilities’.13 This exemplifies the generally narrow perspective on this question in the US.14 If the US continues to measure burden-sharing by the standards of European defence budgets, the DCI, alignment with JV 2010/2020, a US-defined RM A/ transformation or Congressional demands, transatlantic squabbling will continue.
In place of traditional aspects of security and defence, tomorrow's strategic partnership should, and probably will, be dominated by trade, international politics, global crisis management, safeguarding common interests and commodities, arms control, non-proliferation and export-control regimes, counter-terrorism, international crime and strategic defences.15 Traditional military capabilities will play a minor role.16 The NATO-centric view is no longer relevant, and it will be in Washington's interests to have a broader and more multifaceted perception of, and relationship with, the ESDP, CFSP and European security arrangements. For all elements but European collective defence and high-end peace enforcement in Europe, the EU will be a more interesting partner in global crisis management than the European pillar within NATO. The new transatlantic strategic partnership will be a blend of respect, prestige, competition and cooperation in almost all fields. Developing this new partnership will not resolve the debates on European priorities, procurement budgets, NATO-EU relations and how best to address global threats – but these questions will be dealt with differently, and hopefully in a more constructive way.
For some time to come, the EU will remain a union of independent states, with their own interests and priorities.17 Europe wants to be treated as the equal of the US, while maintaining national agendas and close bilateral contacts – which, from an outsider's perspective, is perhaps not a logical position. The challenge is for Europe to take steps towards greater coherence and to prove its worth as a strategic partner in global security. Conversely, it may be in Washington's interest to prove to the EU and the European states that the US provides a multifaceted security-projecting capability, and has more to offer than military might.
The question is not whether the ESDP should or could replace NATO, but how to bring about effective cooperation and coordination. Both the EU and NATO are mere institutions to enhance their member states' policies and assets, and facilitate cooperation and coordination between members. It is up to the members, particularly the major players with membership in both, to develop sound institutional working relationships.
Although the higher goals of the EU and NATO are the same and their membership broadly similar, there are fundamental differences. Their histories differ, as do their approaches to defence and crisis management, their expertise and their mandates. Other points of difference are size, budget, decision-making processes and command-and-control capabilities. The role of individual states within the two organisations – not least the US – is not equal, nor is the level of national sovereignty.
A strict division of labour between NATO and the EU would not be good for Europe, the US or the institutional development of either organisation. Above all, no European state wants two separate force structures. As the ESDP's formal focus is the Petersberg spectrum, there is a risk that NATO will be relegated to collective defence.18 The alternative is to accept duplication and to continue to focus on commonalities, coordination and cooperation in military crisis management.19 Even in the longer term, duplication will be good for NATO's vitality, European capabilities and the transatlantic strategic partnership as a whole.
NATO's status as the sole Western security structure has fundamentally changed with the ESDP, and it is probable, as Stephen Walt argued back in 1998, that the high-water mark of transatlantic security cooperation has passed. Transatlantic security cooperation has entered a new phase.20 NATO's comparative advantages include the direct involvement of the US in European defence through US security guarantees to its allies; its role as a security forum and a forum for interoperability and common military standards; access to US force transformation; and its function as a structure to provide transatlantic cooperation in times of need. The pan-European nature of NATO and its partnerships, the stabilising effect it has had on Central and South-Eastern Europe and its role in European crisis management since 1992 are all valuable for European security. NATO will remain an important organisation and will retain its relevance, even in a transformed strategic partnership. Relations between the EU and NATO should be developed as long as NATO continues to play an important role in security and the EU-US relationship is embryonic, and until such time as the EU has addressed key flaws in its crisis-management capabilities and ended its dependence on US assets and capabilities for high-end military operations.