NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) is often perceived as a reaction to the European deficiencies highlighted by Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999.1 According to the US Department of Defense (DoD), the European allies were particularly weak in precision strike, mobility and command and control and communications (C3), and lacked sufficient strategic lift and aircraft for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (European nations did, however, have sufficient tactical and operational airlift).2 Poor doctrinal and technical interoperability among the allies were seen as further challenges.3
In fact, the DCI began as a US initiative in June 1998, designed to address the growing technological gap between the US and its NATO allies, the strategic de-coupling of Europe and the US and declining European defence budgets and procurement. Increased European defence spending and off-the-shelf procurement of capabilities were seen as the solution. By late 2002 and the NATO Summit in Prague, however, little had changed in US and European perceptions of capabilities.
The DCI was seen in the US as a blueprint for NATO's response to the US-led Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and Joint Vision (JV) doctrines.4 However, faced with obvious European weaknesses during the Kosovo campaign, the DCI was transformed into NATO policy just ahead of the Washington Summit, and was adopted with little debate.5 Significantly, the goals were not the result of a comprehensive NATO assessment, nor were they linked to any specific scenarios.6 With hindsight, the DCI was narrowly focused on military capabilities and towards conventional military crisis management. Nevertheless, the DCI did add momentum to European defence restructuring, and its effects will be felt throughout the decade.
The DCI identified 58 vital upgrade goals in deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, effective engagement, the survivability of forces and infrastructure and command-and-control and information systems.7 Several involved the military use of commercial sea and airlift, the sharing or pooling of transport assets, establishing multinational logistic units and expanding logistics and support forces. Other goals included acquiring precision-guided munitions, all-weather weapon systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), stealth aircraft, cruise missiles and non-lethal weapons. Nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) protection and C3 were also covered, as were ‘softer’ areas to do with concepts, policies and doctrines. Several goals related to battlefield ground surveillance (such as Joint-STARS) and theatre- and ballistic-missile defence.8 The DCI was noticeably similar to the ‘wish-lists’ of the US and the Western European Union (WEU), and the French and British after-action reports on Kosovo.
Of the 58 goals, a number were seen as ‘low-hanging fruits’ – delivering additional capabilities reasonably quickly, and without great cost. Most coordination, cooperation and training objectives fell into this category. The DCI was also seen as a mechanism for increasing interoperability in peace-support operations. A majority of the goals were applicable to NATO partners, and were channelled to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) planning and review process.9
Within the alliance, national interpretations of the DCI varied widely. In general, most Eastern European NATO members saw it as a long-term project to be dealt with after they had adapted their own armed forces, a process expected to take ten years or more. Thus, the DCI was seen as geared mostly towards the UK, France and Germany, because most of its elements are expensive, involve advanced technology or take for granted a certain degree of interoperability. Smaller NATO countries welcomed the DO, but claimed that there was little prospect of them contributing to its large, high-tech projects. France and the UK seemed to interpret the DCI as a confirmation of their own defence-restructuring efforts and as support for some of their pet national projects; the big gain for Europe, they argued, would be if Germany transformed its armed forces in line with DCI goals. Germany took a selective approach to the DCI, stating that only three elements were of interest: strategic lift, command and control and intelligence. Much could be done through increased interoperability, joint doctrines and multinational exercises, and not everything had to be high-tech. In both France and Germany, there was a widespread perception that the DCI was a US shopping list, not least since the only way to quickly acquire new and advanced combat systems was to buy them off the shelf, and that essentially meant buying American.
The US has seen the DCI as a way of getting its allies to ‘field a 21st century force’.10 The problem is that the US and Europe have different perceptions of what such a force should be. For the US, there is a direct parallel between the DCI and its transformational JV 2010 and 2020 (‘net-centric warfare’) doctrine. The two are part of a common US understanding of the kind of capabilities ‘required to address the future security environment as seen by the US and NATO’.11 Although many of the buzzwords from JV 2010 have found their way into the UK's Strategic Defence Review, NATO's Strategic Concept, allied communiqués and the DCI, European willingness to sign up should not be taken for granted.12
It would be wishful thinking to believe that all NATO allies agree with the interpretations of the RMA prevalent in the US debate, and much less with a US-led RMA for the alliance. While there is recognition of the need for interoperability with US forces and a growing realisation that technological advances ought to be better exploited for European defence and security, few if any European states have indicated that their own acquisition priorities match those of the US.13 Furthermore, not all Europeans are yet prepared to accept US-designed concepts for future joint warfare or the US military transformation model.14 Although these transformation concepts contain valuable components and guiding ideas, for the majority of European defence forces, with a different baseline, different missions and different priorities, the US vision in its entirety lies far over the horizon.
Regardless of the vocal US agenda and the DCI's preoccupation with high technology, its emphasis on interoperable, mobile and effective military capabilities is relevant in most types of international coalition warfare, whatever its nature. Several of the DCI goals – strategic airlift, for example – have less to do with NATO missions in the Euro-Atlantic area or with net-centric warfare visions than with land-based coalition warfare of the kind seen in Iraq in 1991 and in Afghanistan in 2001, and the kind which will characterise future large-scale US-led war-fighting coalitions. Where such DCI goals match EU scenarios and ambitions, the prospects for implementation are probably the best. However, the DCI has enjoyed only limited progress, at least in relation to US objectives. From its launch in 1999, few in NATO's International Staff in Brussels or at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) have been optimistic about the process. The DCI has made little if any difference to the development of European military capabilities.
In late 1999, European states finalised an audit of the assets and capabilities available for Petersberg tasks.15 The audit was based on the Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU – a catalogue of national forces potentially available for WEU operations), and those committed to the NATO/PfP planning and review process. Although much of the terminology was the same, the audit differed from the DCI in that it focused more on what Europe would need for autonomous operations.
Although the WEU had the necessary forces in terms of numbers to conduct military operations across the Petersberg spectrum, the audit identified a number of capability gaps and weaknesses.16 ‘severe gaps’ were found in airborne C3, suppressive electronic warfare, combat search and rescue, stealth technology and precision-strike capabilities. The audit concluded that European forces were ‘very weak’ in military strategic heavy lift, and relied on civilian assets in this area. Capabilities were ‘very limited’ in intelligence provision at strategic political and military levels, and in deployable secure tactical communications in theatre, air mobility, psychological warfare, deployable combined joint headquarters, deployable combined air operations centres and electronic/signals intelligence. There was also a serious shortfall in the capabilities required for evacuation operations. The audit pointed out that European forces depended on roads for their ground mobility, and that air mobility (helicopters and tactical air lift) was lacking. Although few states reported on civilian assets, the audit concluded that civil-military coordination was also unsatisfactory. Reconstruction and administrative capabilities were weak, and only one country claimed to be able to provide full assistance to a population affected by an NBC attack. Surprisingly, the audit concluded that interoperability, readiness and sustainability were acceptable – a point which questions its credibility given that these remain huge challenges.
In ‘realistic’ quantitative terms, the audit counted 66 infantry battalions, 18 armoured regiments, two special-forces battalions and four field hospitals.17 Maritime forces included three aircraft carriers, ten amphibious ships, 75 destroyers and frigates, 59 mine-countermeasures craft, 34 submarines and 62 sealift and support ships. Ship-based air power was deemed sufficient for self-defence, but extremely limited in any strike or area air-defence capacity. In the air, European forces could muster some 152 air-defence fighters, 137 attack aircraft, 144 light-to-medium transport aircraft (C-130S and smaller), 126 small-to-medium lift helicopters, 24 reconnaissance aircraft, 26 air-to-air refuelling aircraft and seven airborne early-warning (AWACS) aircraft. Only one mobile combined air operations centre was committed. While the capability of this asset would initially be limited, it would increase to a level of 600 sorties a day after three months in theatre.
These assets were compared with the 1996–97 WEU Illustrative Profiles/scenarios, drawn up by the WEU and elaborated and developed by the NATO Combined Joint Planning Staff. For the high-end Separation of Parties scenario, involving two divisions (with equivalent air and maritime forces) in a 12-month operation 6,000 km from Brussels, it was concluded that Europe had sufficient land forces, but lacked air assets for strategic lift, suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) and electronic warfare. For the conflict-prevention scenario (involving a brigade and equivalent air and maritime components, for less than a year, up to 3,500 km away) Europe had all the assets and capabilities required. In the lower-end scenarios, including humanitarian aid and assistance and evacuation operations, European forces could meet almost all of the requirements. In short, in 1999 Europe had the capabilities to manage a small, high-intensity operation, and any lower-intensity conventional military operations. European forces were not capable of larger, complex and/or distant land operations like KFOR, or major air operations like Allied Force.
The audit was solely a quantitative exercise based on conventional military forces earmarked for the FAWEU, or identified in NATO's planning processes. Qualitative issues – whether forces were available, deployable, sustainable and interoperable – were not assessed. A majority of declared forces were already double- or triple-hatted or more, and a significant proportion were deployed in peace-support operations. For WEU operations, many assets would have had to be taken out of NATO reaction forces. WEU military staff complained that much of the national data were superficial, and information provided by some states was clearly unrealistic. Unconventional capabilities beyond the traditional Petersberg spectrum (for example defence against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and enhanced high explosive (CBRNE) weapons or counter-terrorism) were generally not included in the audit.
The audit was generally critical and realistic in its assessments of Europe's conventional military capabilities. Both WEU military staff and the nations reporting their assets knew that the findings would not be binding, nor would they form the basis for any operational planning within the WEU. The audit also appeared to have been less influenced by national defence-industrial politics than the DCI. By applying the WEU label, which was seen by NATO and the US as relatively harmless, the EU could also use the audit as a springboard towards the Headline Goal, which was agreed at Helsinki in December 1999.
The Headline Goal added the first real substance to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).18 Under the Goal, by 2003 EU member states committed themselves to being able to deploy and sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000–60,000 personnel). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining, with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat-support services and air and naval elements. Member states should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and to provide smaller rapid-response elements more quickly than this. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year.19 The following year, in November 2000, the EU Capabilities Commitment Conference resulted in the Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC), which constituted the current sum of national commitments. In addition, the Helsinki Headline Catalogue (HHC) represented an assessment of what the EU would need to fulfil the scenarios developed from the Headline Goal. In effect, the HFC and the HHC reflected what EU member states wished to commit to the Headline Goal in 2003, and what capabilities they wanted to create.
At the Cologne Summit in June 1999, EU members agreed that action would be taken ‘without prejudice to actions by NATO’.20 At Helsinki, the phrase ‘where NATO as a whole is not engaged’ replaced this formula.21 This wording guarantees the EU full freedom to act autonomously. In EU operations that can be conducted without recourse to NATO assets, the EU is not dependent on NATO consensus, although US and NATO support would be a bonus. The single institutional framework and decision-making autonomy of the EU in EU-only operations is considered non-negotiable. As in any other organisation, the members are sovereign in deciding if, when and with whom they are prepared to cooperate. This includes inviting non-members to participate in EU operations.22
The HFC included only a fraction of the EU's 1.8 million soldiers, 160 destroyers and frigates, 75 tactical submarines and 3,300-plus combat aircraft in 2000.23 The majority of EU member states committed just about all the interoperable capabilities they had, and these states would be hard-pressed to fulfil their commitments. Nevertheless, what has been committed to the Headline Goal represents the elements of a major fighting force, albeit a rather traditional one. The EU Military Staff initially concluded that member states had committed more than enough HQs, combat brigades, combat aircraft and manpower, but not always the right kind of units. The flaws lay in in-theatre transport, AW ACS, air-to-air refuelling, SEAD and electronic warfare, plus strategic airlift and sealift. Psychological-operations battalions, cruise missiles, airborne battlefield command and control, UAVs, airborne signals and electronic intelligence and satellite intelligence elements were also lacking.24 In 2002, Europe did not own a single military wide-body or long-range strategic transport capable of lifting a main battle tank or transporting the bulky Patriot missile system. In addition, the quality and/or availability of some of the committed HQs (five operational HQs and four Force HQs) are questionable.
Most force contributions were double-hatted, and had already been offered to UN standby forces, FAWEU, NATO rapid-reaction forces and multinational constellations such as EUROFOR and EUROCORPS. Only a handful of countries committed new or more capable forces to the EU. Almost all countries put severe restrictions on their forces; the majority of supporting units were limited to supporting national contributions, and would only be used to support European allies if paid for their services. As for commitments by non-EU allied and EU candidates, Turkey limited itself to what had previously been listed in the FAWEU, while Norway offered a new contribution to non-NATO European operations of 3,500 soldiers – a significant number, given the country's size and its location in relation to most areas of European crisis management.
Although essentially symbolic, the Europeans offered more forces to the HFC at the Capabilities Commitment Conference than they had assigned to NATO. Greece and Belgium offered a whole brigade to the HFC and only one battalion to NATO-sustained operations. The Netherlands provided one brigade to the EU and two battalions for NATO, and both the Netherlands and Belgium offered considerably more ships to the Headline Goal. The UK, Germany and Turkey provided more than twice as many combat aircraft to the EU as they did to NATO. Although there is a difference between NATO forces allocated to non-Article 5 missions (which in part correlate with NATO rapid-reaction forces) and the Headline Goal, the US took this as a further warning that the EU may increasingly be taken more seriously than NATO. As was the case for assets announced to the WEU Audit, many Headline Goal commitments would have to be taken out of NATO reaction forces for EU use – which would challenge NATO's traditional ‘right’ to a ‘first pick’.
In June 2001, the gap between the HHC – the capabilities deemed necessary – and the HFC – the forces actually committed – was assessed in the first version of the Helsinki Progress Catalogue (HPC). In greater detail than even the WEU Audit, the HPC identified what further capabilities were needed from EU member states, and added some ‘new’ capability gaps, such as theatre-missile defence, which cannot easily be categorised as part of the traditional Petersberg spectrum.
The higher-profile shortfalls listed in the HPC included carrier-based air power, sea-based theatre-missile defence, SEAD aircraft, cruise missiles, precision-guided munitions, air surveillance, attack and reconnaissance helicopters, medium and heavy support helicopters, light infantry and multiple-launch rocket systems. Early-warning and distant-detection requirements (UAVs, AW ACS and airborne early warning, airborne ground surveillance and intelligence satellites), sealift, airlift and amphibious shipping were also highlighted as acute gaps. Other shortfalls included special-operations forces, NBC battalions, psychological operations and electronic warfare. There were also gaps in less spectacular areas, such as transport, general support logistics, medical units, recovery and maintenance, engineering, signals and surveillance and target-acquisition units, and a shortage of military observers and military police.
The HPC paved the way for the November 2001 EU Capability Improvement Conference, which pledged to address the flaws it identified. Although the Western European states made additional contributions, there was essentially no progress in the areas demanding major procurements.
Significant acquisitions and procurements cannot be changed overnight – most acquisitions take several years to plan and finance and major projects can take a decade or more to develop and produce. No matter what the political process or Headline Goal may demand, assets such as strategic airlift, satellites or communications equipment will not be developed or financed in the space of a few years. Besides, as long as most European states feel secure and crisis management is not seen as a matter of defending vital interests, developing capability for distant autonomous high-tech enforcement operations will not be given priority (unless of course it is a question of national prestige, industries or jobs).
At the 2001 conference, member states committed more than 100,000 soldiers, some 400 aircraft and 100 ships. In quantitative terms, levels increased from those reached at the 2000 commitment conference, and gaps relating to bridging-engineer units, electronic warfare and multiple rocket launchers were addressed. Gaps not addressed included logistics, force protection, operational and strategic mobility (air and sea), combat search and rescue and precision-guided munitions. Command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities remained of questionable quality, and shortfalls persisted in surveillance and reconnaissance.
Further steps were taken in February 2002, when EU member states agreed on a voluntary European Capability Action Plan (ECAP). The ECAP aimed to incorporate all the investment, development and coordination measures executed or planned, both nationally and multinationally, with a view to improving existing resources and gradually developing the capabilities deemed necessary for the EU's activities. It offers a forum for identifying requirements, enhancing multilateral coordination and encouraging national initiatives on capabilities. It specifically states that multinational solutions might include the co-production, financing and acquisition of capabilities, particularly for large-scale projects.
The ECAP establishes a number of panels, each focusing on a specific capability such as strategic airlift, UAVs, air-to-ground missiles or communications. Each panel is chaired by a member state (a ‘pilot country’) or two, responsible for leading, coordinating and summarising the panel's work. This adds impetus to the whole process since national prestige is at stake. Unfortunately, there is a tendency for member states to focus on projects that they have a direct interest in developing, or to participate in order to minimise the potential damage to other national pet projects. On the other hand, the prospects for coordination are greater than would have been the case without the ECAP.
Non-military or civilian instruments of crisis management and conflict prevention were also highlighted at Helsinki, though they were not directly linked to the Headline Goal. In recognition of the EU's comparative advantage in this area, member states agreed that: ‘A non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States’25 At the EU summit at Feira in June 2000, the EU decided to focus on four aspects of civilian crisis management: police, the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection.
EU members made it their goal to provide up to 5,000 police officers for international missions by 2003, with 1,000 available at 30 days' notice.26 The Police Action Plan agreed at the Gothenburg summit in June 2001 called for the establishment of operational headquarters, interoperability criteria, training programmes, the development of interfaces with military and other civilian components of crisis management and the development of a legal framework for police operations (including Status of Forces Agreements). Since then, the development of common concepts, command-and-control arrangements, selection and training criteria and compatible equipment lists and guidelines, for instance for criminal procedure and civilian administration in crisis-management operations, has made significant progress. The EU has even been able to offer the UN help in improving its guidelines, for example in the rule-of-law field. This development of common European standards and training will eventually enhance internal police and civil-emergency cooperation within the EU.
The Ministerial Police Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2001 received commitments for 5,000 police officers for crisis-management operations by 2003 – though remarkably without any explicit reference to the changed international environment after 11 September. Of these, 1,400 will be deployable within 30 days. By any measure, this is a major undertaking. The EU police capability is meant to cover the full range of missions, from training, advice and monitoring to executive tasks. In 2003, the EU is to take over the UN police mission in Bosnia, with almost 500 officers. Even if the pledged numbers are available as promised – which is not yet fully the case – it is not certain whether the available assets will be adequate to the task at hand, and whether their deployment will be given sufficient political and financial importance by the states sending them. Language requirements as well as the reluctance of national police forces to make their core personnel available for international missions are further complicating factors.
The development of gendarmerie-type heavy police has made little progress on the European level, but further headway is likely as more European states acknowledge the value of such capabilities for counter-terrorist operations and engagements where traditional police forces are too weak and military combat forces too provocative or expensive. It is likely that the impact of 11 September will in the long run lead to a number of new forms of European internal-security and police cooperation, perhaps including integrated border controls and coast-guard forces.27
During the first half of 2001, civilian crisis management overshadowed the military elements of the ESDP, and the scope of EU crisis management and conflict prevention was significantly broadened, in some eyes beyond the traditional Petersberg range. Members committed themselves to an additional pool of 200 officials for crisis-management operations (judges, prosecutors and correction/penitentiary officers) to supplement the police. The pledging conference in May 2002 actually exceeded this target, with a total pledge of 282 officials. Lead elements are to be deployable within 30 days. The basic idea behind such rule-of-law missions is to ensure that the area of operations has a complete and functioning criminal-justice process. Although these missions will most likely complement police operations, the capability could in theory be deployed on its own, or with other EU capabilities.
EU members also agreed to create a pool of experts in civil administration, ranging from elections and taxation to health services and waste management, and to establish a 2,000-strong civil-protection capability for major natural, technological and environmental emergencies. Key functions would include search and rescue, the construction of refugee camps, logistical support and communications. Although not envisaged at the time, EU states' civil-protection capabilities will also be relevant in the wake of large-scale terrorist attacks. EU member states had already decided at Gothenburg to develop common standards and modules for training, and common exercises.
By the EU Summit in Seville in June 2002, further progress had been made in implementing the Police Action Plan and in civil protection/emergency relief. The non-military aspects of ESDP became more prominent, and the link between civilian and military crisis-management capabilities was reinforced. The EU also reaffirmed that it was prepared to take over the UN police mission in Bosnia from January 2003. Member states agreed that the development of the ESDP and Headline Goal must take fuller account of the capabilities that may be required to combat terrorism. These include enhancing EU instruments for long-term conflict prevention, political dialogue with third countries, nonproliferation and arms control, and providing assistance to third countries so that they can increase their capacity to respond to terrorism. The EU also plans to include anti-terrorism clauses in EU agreements with third countries and to re-evaluate relations in the light of these countries' attitudes towards terrorism. However, although counter-terrorism falls within the realm of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it is questionable whether it can be regarded as part of the ESDP under the 1992 definition of the Petersberg spectrum of tasks. Arguably, counter-terrorism may affect territorial issues and states' self-defence, which do not come under the ESDP – at least for now.
Interim modalities for financing EU crisis-management operations have also been agreed. In principle, the EC budget will pay for institutional administrative costs, while operational expenditures for national military forces engaged in the operation are paid for by the troop-contributing nation. This is the same principle that NATO has used for years. The Council will decide on a case-by-case basis whether deployment and lodging expenses should be regarded as a common or a national cost. Individual states are responsible for deploying and sustaining forces in crisis-management operations. There has been debate over whether the EU should have a separate budget for common costs relating to crisis-management operations, and whether a start-up fund for operations should be established.
In parallel with these capability initiatives, developing security and defence cooperation within the EU has also required structural change. In 1999, EU member states agreed to establish new working bodies. These were set up in March 2000, and made permanent in January 2001. They included:
A Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) was also established, with an embryonic intelligence and assessment cell. This has since developed and grown, with an increased capability to manage intelligence from member states. It has even started to assign tasks to national intelligence services, either informally or, on a voluntary basis, formally. To an extent, the SITCEN can produce its own assessments and analyses in support of the Council and the Council Secretariat. Input from the EU Military Committee, and above all the 120-strong Military Staff, has meant that the quality of concepts, procedures and structures for coordinating crisis management within the EU has vastly improved. The formal mission of the Military Staff is to perform ‘early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks’,28 to provide military expertise and to conduct EU-led military crisis-management operations.29
The Political and Security Committee, which is subordinate to the EU Council, deals with all aspects of the EU's foreign and security policy, including the ESDP. It is the focal point for crisis management. During EU operations, it will exercise political control and provide strategic direction. With the exception of EU operations, the Political and Security Committee is not a decisionmaking body, though it is the prime decision-shaping organ in the CFSP/ESDP realm.
Additional forums have also been established, such as the EU Headline Goal Task Force, a Working Group on Capabilities and the Politico-Military Working Group.30 Since the attacks in the US in September 2001, ESDP institutions have also fed into assessments of the terrorist threat, and have contributed to the Political and Security Committee's position. ESDP processes, procedures and structures were tested in early 2002 in a crisis-management exercise involving Brussels and all EU member states. One of the main lessons of the exercise, the first of its kind in the EU, was the need for stronger civil-military coordination.
Both the US and NATO international staffs have encouraged the Europeans to develop their military capabilities. The reaction in most European capitals has, however, been lukewarm. For most European governments, increasing defence expenditures or signing on to expensive procurement projects that do not benefit domestic employment or growth is not an option. Moreover, while the US may have a clear conception of current threats and what they mean in terms of capabilities, most Europeans have not significantly changed their views on either since the 1990s. For the US, the standard is still US defence spending, US interests and US global commitments and ambitions. The problem is that, whatever initiatives the US comes up with for its NATO allies, defence spending and national procurement are determined by parliaments, governments and the shape of domestic politics within individual countries. It is nonetheless true, as NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson argues, that the Europeans are still spending enormous amounts of money on capabilities that the US and NATO believe they do not need. It is also true that Europeans hesitate to buy US products in areas such as strategic airlift, communications and precision-guided munitions because this offers little benefit to European defence industries, even if these US alternatives are often cheaper, more advanced and readily available ‘off-the-shelf’.
For many Europeans, the normal NATO defence planning process, as opposed to fast-track initiatives à la the DCI, appear sufficient as a mechanism for developing interoperability and new capabilities. In this context, the ESDP's role in defence planning has been difficult to grasp. The EU's review mechanism, the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), the collective name for the permanent process that sets in once a political Headline Goal is set, mirrors NATO's process. It is geared towards identifying required capabilities, getting member states to commit to them, and then monitoring progress and addressing shortfalls. A working interface between EU and NATO activities in this area is essential if unnecessary and unhelpful duplication is to be avoided. However, some Europeans hope that, by using EU defence planning through the CDM and the ECAP, US involvement and pressure can be kept to a minimum. Certain EU governments have been more comfortable discussing procurement and capabilities development in this forum, rather than in NATO. Some European governments have stressed their preference to look beyond traditional military capabilities and take a more comprehensive view of security and the projection of security to crisis regions, to encompass elements such as aid, confidence-building, state-building and police or gendarmerie operations. This approach is in part based on experiences in the Balkans, and also reflects deep differences with the US over the threat posed by terrorism, ballistic-missile attacks and weapons of mass destruction, as well as the nature of relations with countries such as Libya, Iran and Iraq.
In this context, it is worth noting what the Europeans have signed up to in NATO. In a Statement on Capabilities, agreed by NATO defence ministers in June 2002, member states acknowledged that the capacity of the alliance to carry out the full range of its missions will depend largely on its ability to ‘increase substantially’ the proportion of combat and support forces available for out-of-area deployment, or where there is little or no host-nation support. Future capabilities should focus on defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks, secure command communications and information superiority, interoperability and the rapid deployment and sustainment of combat forces. NATO states also agreed to encourage ‘the pooling of military capabilities, increasing role specialisation, cooperative acquisition of equipment and multinational funding’.31 Change is, however, likely to be slow, and it will be several years before the impact is felt on NATO force planning.
NATO's Prague Summit in November 2002 seemed set to follow past patterns. The Prague Capabilities Commitment, launched by the US and the NATO Secretary General, set out the following aims:
Although many of the above increases are substantial in relative terms, one must remember the real starting point which is often less impressive. Significantly, the process generated two new formulas that should be applauded, whatever the institutional label. The first is a pool of jointly-owned and operated support jamming pods for electronic warfare, an air-to-air refuelling fleet and UAVs. The second idea is for Europe to lease 10–12 US C-17 aircraft (or equivalents) until the delivery of the Airbus A400M by the end of the decade. Obviously, this ‘wish list’ will not materialise in full, even if the new formulas were accepted by European states. It all costs money, which most European defence budgets do not have.
At the summit, the US also launched a new NATO Response Force (NRF). The idea is that NATO needs a multinational joint force for primarily out-of-area operations, with immediate readiness (5–30 days).33 The force is to be operational by 2006. Tasks are similar to the EU Headline Goal, and include non-combatant evacuation operations, proactive force projection and serving as an initial entry force for a large-scale operation. The US emphasis is however on joint high-intensity combat outside Europe. According to the proposal, the force is to comprise around 20,000 soldiers, with a brigade-sized land component. In its expeditionary nature, there are similarities between the new US Interim Brigade Combat Team (which is under development) and the NRF's land component. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) HQs would be suitable for the NRF. The idea is that the NRF would set a new standard for European military capabilities. The need for strategic airlift, air refuelling, secure command and control and precision-guided munitions for the European elements of the NRF would be clear and European governments would be challenged to set the necessary priorities. The side benefit would be a new US-European project, with increased military cooperation and interoperability.34
According to US Senator Jesse Helms, former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the EU ‘could not fight its way out of a wet paper bag’.35 Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has called the Headline Goal a ‘monumental folly’ designed to ‘satisfy political vanity’, with ‘no military sense at all’.36
Europe's capabilities are not quite that bad, and the EU Headline Goal and enhanced crisis-management capabilities are reasonable and logical from the point of view of almost all Western governments. Both for Europe and for future military and security cooperation between the EU and the US, not to mention Western conflict prevention, many benefits could be derived from a successful ESDP and EU/NATO capabilities initiatives pursued with determination. After having identified the capability gaps, and after having declared that Europe will be able to do more, Europe has little choice but to deliver. By late 2002, key structures were in place and the stage was set for measurable improvements. Significant challenges still remain, but there is little doubt that Europeans will eventually adjust and increase their military and non-military crisis-management capabilities. When, by how much and against which threats remain to be seen.