Anexo 5. El propio secretario de Estado Henry Kissinger se implica muy directamente en las negociaciones que garantizan la subordinación de España a los intereses estratégicos norteamericanos, como se puede comprobar en este documento del 20 de febrero de 1970.

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11. The Spanish Armed Forces remain firmly under General Franco’s control and the regime continues to rely on their support and influence, principally that of the Army, to assure the maintenance of political stability. Basically, those forces have a capability only for manteining internal security, for conducting a limited delaying action against a modern well-equipped force and for defending Spanish possessions in North Africa against attacks by forces from neighboring states. All three of Spain’s Armed Services have shown marked improvement as a result of U. S. aid, but are still far from having a satisfactory capability for defense. The predominance of obsolete equipment, the limited prospects of obtaining large numbers of modern weapons, the low level of education and lack of technical experience of Spanish manpower, and the extremely limited capability of Spain’s present economy to support a modern military force, forecast a continued reliance by Spain on outside assistance to maintain the level of effectiveness wich has been achieved since 1953.

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February 20, 1970

National Security Decision Memorandum 43

TO: The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Director, Bureau of Budget

SUBJECT: US Policy Toward Spain: Base Negotiations

With reference to the Memorandum of January 26 to the Chairman, NSC Review Group, and the memorands to the President from Secretary of State (January 27), the Secretary of Defense (January 30), and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (February 2), the President has decided, with respect to the negotiations with the Spanish, that:

1. We should seek to retain as many of the present and desired military rights facilities as are possible within the limits of a sustainable quid pro quo; negotiations to this end should not be protracted.

2. Promt agreement should be reached within the Government on a quid pro quo wich can be offered in the negotiations, sustained over the term of the agreement, and wich will avoid an ampasse with Congresss; similarly, prompt agreement should be reached on priorities to be accorded to each facility, taking into account military requirements, duplication or relocation costs and political sensitivities. Priorities should be agreed through the DPRC in the context of five-year force and budget projections, and quid pro quo should be agreed through the Under Secretaries Committee.

3. With the aim of seeking continued good relations with the Government of Spain through the 1970’s a course of action should be developed with respect to concluding a general treaty of cooperation, and to renewed efforts to develop a Spanish link to NATO.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director of Central Intelligence

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff