Anexo 3. Una comunicación secreta, fechada el 7 de marzo de 1970 y dirigida al Consejo nacional de Seguridad norteamericano, recomienda realizar diversas presiones internacionales encaminadas a conseguir el ingreso de España en la OTAN.

-- regular consultations between SACEUR and the Government of Spain on military matters of mutual interest;

-- establishment of, and full Spanish participation in a "NATO-Iberian Training Complex", enabling NATO forces to meet weapons training requirements at Spanish and Portuguese facilities, and wich might involve the participation of the UK, FRG, Portugal, and Spain (and perhaps France, in granting the necessary overflight rights);

-- enhanced political consultation, like current NATO/MALTA arrangements;

-- possible Spanish involvement in the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society.

British and German support would be a key to achieving any relationship, and we should be prepared to use all the influence wich we can muster with them to achieve their consent. The main problems lie in the political opposition to Franco by the Socialist parties in the Scandinavian and Benelux countries, and the UK.

Tactically, we believe that before approaching our allies, wee should discuss a possible "scenario" with the Spanish so that we would have a better idea of precisely what arrangements might be of interest to them. We expect Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo to visit Washington on March 17 and 18, and we could discuss all of the possible Spanish-NATO arrangements with him at that time. The Spanish may relate this more to their own desire to move towards Europe and use their own new activist "European" policy--including their rapprochement with France--to gain support from other countries for these arrangements. In any event, we should be prepared to make the strongest possible effort on behalf of NATO-Spanish arrangement.

The spanish clearly desire positive results from these NATO initiatives within the lifetime of our